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The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was the first major revision of the bank-
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to approve aplan which the majority of each of the other classes also approves. It is
through this section that creditors are encouraged to reach agreement extraudicially
through the consent of a majority of each impaired class. The Article also examines
the consequences of the plan proponent's failure to obtain a confirmation through
acceptance of a majority of each class and theproblems ofpossiblyforcing accept-
ance of a plan on nonaccepting classes.
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INTRODUCTION
Since October 1, 1979, chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code' has
been the only chapter under which a business entity of any size
can be reorganized.2 This chapter replaces former section 77 (lim-
ited to railroad reorganizations) 3 and chapters X, XI, and XII of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.4 While chapter 11 borrowed heavily
from the old acts, particularly from chapters X and XI, it adds
new dimension to the corporate reorganization process.
This Article briefly summarizes the historical development of
and need for corporate reorganization law.5 Particular emphasis
is given to the confirmation process in section 1129(a) 6-a process
which is accomplished only with the consent of what we will call a
"statutory majority" of each impaired class-and its attendant
problems.7 Furthermore, the consequences of failing to obtain
confirmation of a plan under section 1129(a) because of the ab-
sence of acceptance by the statutorily required majority are high-
lighted.' Attention is also directed to forcing a dissenting class to
accept a plan under section 1129(b).9
I. HISTORY
In any economy where goods or services are supplied on credit
or where money is loaned to enable the buyer to purchase goods
or services or pay debts, debtor-creditor law is necessary. For cen-
turies that law has contained, and continues to contain, two incon-
sistent principles. The first principle is that, if a credit economy is
to function, the debtor must be required to pay the debt as agreed
even if payment requires great sacrifice by the debtor. The second
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (Supp. I1 1979).
2. Cf. id. §§ 1301-1330. Under chapter 13, an individual's small business might be
reorganized.
3. Act of Aug. 27, 1935, ch. 774, § 77, 49 Stat. 911 (amending Bankruptcy Act of
1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544).
4. Act of July 7, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, amendedby Bankruptcy Act of 1938, ch.
575, 52 Stat. 840. Chapter X governed corporate reorganizations, chapter XI governed
arrangements, and chapter XII governed real property arrangements of certain
noncorporate persons.
5. See infra notes 10-34 and accompanying text.
6. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (Supp. III 1979). For a discussion of the § I129(a)(8) pro-
cess see infra text accompanying notes 127-45.
7. For a definition of the term "statutory majority" see infra text accompanying notes
146-48. See also infra notes 118-64 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 165-83 and accompanying text.
9. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (Supp. III 1979). See infra notes 185-206 and accompanying
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principle looks the other way: if this payment is adjudged by soci-
ety to be too harsh, the law may soften the bargain by postponing
the time of payment, reducing the amount to be paid, changing
the form of compensation, or, in many cases, discharging the debt
with little or even no payment." Modem bankruptcy legislation,
including modem corporate reorganization law, continues to bal-
ance these two principles.
Ancient law is replete with examples of debtor-creditor law
resolving each of the contrary social policies behind these princi-
ples. In ancient Jewish law, for example, the creditor was allowed
to take the debtor's garment in pledge by day but was required to
return the garment for the cool of the night." In a Jubilee year,1
2
payment might be forgiven altogether.' 3
In Roman law, the debtor gave control of not only his goods,
but also his body, to the creditor.' 4 Some creditors even main-
tained private prisons for debtors who were in default.' 5 Roman
law, like Jewish law, however, had what was considered, at the
time, to be a more humane side. In the fourth century B.C., the
Romans abolished the law which allowed a creditor "to kill or sell
the defaulting debtor."' 6 By A.D. 161, the law, in some circum-
stances, authorized a composition by which a majority of creditors
could agree to take less than the amount of their debt and thereby
bind all creditors to do likewise.' 7
This principle of allowing the majority of a class to take away
rights of a minority was incorporated into the Bankruptcy Act of
1938 by Section 12 in a limited way.' 8 Chapter XI expanded the
composition principle,' 9 but chapter X, adopted the same day, al-
10. See generally J. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY (1956).
11. Exodus 22:25, 26; Deuteronomy 24:13-22; see I R. DE VAUX, ANCIENT ISRAEL:
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 169 (2d ed. 1965);see also 2 Kings 4:1-7, ctedin R. DE VAuXsupra,
at 172.
12. The Jubilee year occurred every fifty years. R. DE VAUX, supra note 11, at 175.
13. Id. at 176.
14. Dalhuisen, Roman Law of Credltors'Remedies, in EUROPEAN BANKRUPTCY LAWS
1, 3 (I. Ross ed. 1974).
15. Id. at 4.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 8.
18. Section 12 of the act is reproduced in W. BLUM & S. KAPLAN, MATERIALS ON
REORGANIZATION, RECAPITALIZATION, AND INSOLVENCY 212-13 (1969). Parts of section
12 lived on in chapter XI.
19. A chapter XI arrangement was essentially a composition between a debtor and his
unsecured creditors.
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most denied the principle.2° Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, the composition principle is almost controlling under sec-
tion 1129(a). Section 1129(a) largely allows a two-thirds statutory
majority of each class to decide the compensation its members
must accept if a similar majority of each other class also consents.
The composition principle does not apply as between classes:
classes A, B, and C cannot bind class D by their acceptance. Sec-
tion 1129(b) gives the court the power to decide whether the plan
binds the nonassenting class.
While the number of credit transactions has increased in re-
cent history, creditor rights and remedies are not new. Credit has
been a prominent feature of American life since early colonial
days. Many settlers obtained passage to America on credit as in-
dentured servants. 2' As early as 1705, the seeds of modem bank-
ruptcy legislation began to sprout in Massachusetts.22 In colonial
and post-colonial times, legislatures in various colonies granted
petitions for relief from arrest for debt and petitions for discharge
from debt. In 1764, for example, the Rhode Island legislature
granted eleven petitions for relief from debt and denied an equal
number.23 In 1824, it was reported that an eighteen-year-old girl,
with a child at her breast, was imprisoned for failing to pay a six
to eight dollar debt.24 As late as 1888, the New York City debtor's
jail held 1,300 prisoners in custody for debts valued at less than
twenty-five dollars, with more than half of the jail population ow-
ing less than ten dollars.25
At the corporate level, the 1851 decision in Macon & Western
Railroad Co. v. Parker6 possibly initiated the process by which a
court could prevent individual creditor actions which would dis-
member a railroad and began an eighty-year period of railroad
equity receiverships. The Georgia Supreme Court in Parker ap-
proved the lower court's action in preserving a railroad's assets by
staying the hands of creditors who were pursuing their remedies in
20. Chapter X's requirement that no class could retain any interest unless every prior
class was compensated fully was inconsistent with the composition principle.
21. P. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISON-
MENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY 1607-1900, at 228 (1974). This text traces the history
of American debtor- creditor law from colonial times.
22. Id. at 45.
23. Id. at 96.
24. Id. at 42.
25. Id. at 117.
26. 9 Ga. 377 (1851).
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other courts. 2 7 The court in Parker recognized the need for a de-
vice which acknowledged both the rights of creditors to be com-
pensated and the right of the debtor to remain economically
viable. Until it was almost completely displaced in 1938 by the
chapters added to the Bankruptcy Act, the equity receivership was
the traditional corporate reorganization device for both railroad
and nonrailroad corporations. In the late 1920's, the United
States Supreme Court expressed doubts concerning the extensive
use of this device.28
In 1933, Congress, perhaps influenced by the hint from the
Court, enacted section 77 of the Bankrutcy Act, which was inter-
preted to have eliminated the equity receivorship in railroad reor-
ganizations.2 9 In the following year, Congress added section 77B
which almost eliminated the equity receivership in nonrailroad re-
organization. 30  Section 77 was amended in 1935, 3 1 and section
77B was replaced in 1938 by chapter X.32 At the same time, chap-
ter XI replaced and expanded the composition provisions of sec-
tions 12 and 74 of the Bankruptcy Act.33 Finally, in 1978,
Congress repealed the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and replaced it with
the Bankruptcy Code (except as to pending cases).34
27. Id. at 394. For the importance of holding offcreditors temporarily ifa reorganiza-
tion is to be possible, see Coogan, Broude & Glatt, Comments on Some Reorganization
Provisions of the Pending Bankruptcy Bills, 30 Bus. LAW. 1149passim (1975).
28. See First Nat'l Bank v. Flersham, 290 U.S. 504 (1933); Harvin v. Brundage, 276
U.S. 36 (1927).
29. Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 204, § 77, 47 Stat. 1467, 1474-82 (amending Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544). See New England Coal & Coke Co. v. Rutland R.R.
Co., 143 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1944) (interpreting § 77).
30. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 912-22 (amending Bankruptcy Act of
1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544).
31. Act of Aug. 27, 1935, ch. 774, § 77, 49 Stat. 911-26 (amending Bankruptcy Act of
1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544).
32. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 1(101), 52 Stat. 840, 883 (amending Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544) repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Title IV,
§ 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682. [Hereinafter Bankruptcy Act of 1938.]
33. Sections 12 and 74 of the Bankruptcy Act authorized compromises with creditors.
See Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434,
448 (1940). For a discussion of the historical aspects of these provisions in relation to § 77B,
chapter X, and chapter XI see id. at 448-58. See generall, E. DODD & D. BILLYOU, CASES
& MATERIALS ON CORPORATE REORGANIZATION (1950).
34. The term "Bankruptcy Act" or "the act" is used to refer to the 1898 Act, while
"the code" is used to refer to the legislation which generally became effective October 1,
1979. The act designated numbers of chapters in Roman numerals, e.g., chapter X. The
code uses arabic numbers, e.g., chapter 11, and skips even numbers in chapter and section
numbers.
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I. FACTORS LEADING TO CORPORATE REORGANIZATION
The causes of financial loss which lead to reorganization are
almost infinite in character. Great variations of bad luck and bad
judgment are the most common causes of inability to pay business
debts as they fall due. One wheat grower suffers crop losses from
excess rain which causes the seed to rot. In the same year, wheat
growers in another part of the country suffer similar harm from
the lack of rain. The loss of a year's crop makes it impossible to
repay loans made for seed and cultivation. Financial difficulties
also result from increases in the cost of money, oil, or an essential
raw material or service. Competition does not allow the debtor to
recover the increased costs. An established manufacturer becomes
complacent about his substantial market share; because he has
been successful with the established product, he has given little
attention to research and development. A competitor introduces a
new, improved product and takes the lead. Unsuccessful attempts
to force the public to purchase the old products deplete the lower
amount of revenues until cash becomes perilously low. An air
controllers' strike causes an airline to reduce its number of flights
and thus its revenues. Bad judgment, including unwise expansion
into new areas, as well as bad luck beyond the debtor's control,
can cause the financial loss that leads to reorganization. 5 Fraud
and breach of trust, though much less common than bad luck or
bad judgment, also may cause financial problems.
Whatever the cause of the loss, when the debtor discovers (or
some of his creditors conclude for him) that it is impossible for
him to meet his contractual obligations, rearrangement of the
debtor-creditor relationship is required. Sometimes the debtor or
some of his creditors will see no hope except through complete
liquidation and discharge of indebtedness for whatever portion of
the debt it brings. The debtor or the creditors may initiate a chap-
ter 7 liquidation. To the typical debtor, this is economic death.
Any arrangement that continues economic life is preferable not
only to the debtor but also to many creditors.
In the absence of resort to relief under the Bankruptcy Code
by the debtor or some other creditors, each individual creditor re-
tains the traditional remedies. A creditor may be concerned about
his debtor's affairs even though no debt is due him at the moment.
The creditor may or may not have a right to accelerate maturity of
35. See, e.g., In re Yale Express Sys. Inc., 250 F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 370 F.2d
433 (2d Cir. 1966).
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future payments. In the typical installment loan or purchase
agreement, when a debtor is unable to pay one installment of in-
terest or principal on a long-term debt, the creditor has the right to
accelerate the maturity of the entire debt. The debtor may be able
to repay the debt by selling some of his assets or borrowing from
others. Accelerating the maturity of the debt, however, often gives
the creditor no comfort since it is unlikely that a debtor who is
unable to pay one interest installment will be able to repay the
entire debt.
If the obligation is due and is secured by collateral, the secured
creditor can seize the collateral and with great good luck, sell it for
enough to repay the debt. More often, at a distress sale, the collat-
eral will sell for less than the amount of the debt and much less
than its value to the debtor in a continuing operation.
When the debtor defaults in payment of an unsecured debt,
the unsecured creditor can obtain judgment, levy an execution on
particular assets of the debtor, sell the property, and, with good
fortune, receive payment out of the proceeds. This process will
not produce the desired results, however, if another creditor al-
ready has obtained a security interest in or attached the assets.
Needless to say, acceleration of a debt's maturity and the execu-
tion process are highly objectionable to the debtor and its employ-
ees and may be more than objectionable to the other creditors.
Some other creditors may file a bankruptcy petition to prevent
a sale. If bankruptcy should follow, the trustee may recover the
asset or payment as a preference. Individual action may be unsat-
isfactory even to the levying creditor. Thus, either the debtor or
the creditors may decide that he or they would prefer a reorgani-
zation of some sort-informal, if possible; formal, if necessary.
The success of conventional creditor remedies, including mort-
gage remedies, may be impaired further by the size or type of the
assets. In 1851, in Macon & Western Railroad Co. v. Parker,36 for
example, the Georgia Supreme Court recognized that "disastrous
consequences would have resulted, if each judgment creditor had
been allowed to seize and sell separate portions of the [rail]road,
at different sales, in the six different Counties through which it
passed, and to different purchasers! ' 37 By the end of the nine-
teenth century, the Supreme Court recognized the inadequacy of
conventional debtor-creditor laws in complex situations and, in
36. 9 Ga. 377 (1851).
37. Id. at 394.
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the absence of any better procedure, blessed the equity receiver-
ship.38 Today, however, even where size is not a complicating fac-
tor, the nature of the collateral may make application of
conventional liquidation remedies disappointing not only to the
debtor, but also to the creditor who brought these remedies into
action. Work in process in a textile manufacturing concern, for
example, may scarcely be worth the cost of removing it from the
machines. The creditor may have a right to liquidate the entity,
but often liquidation is not the answer; if, however, the entity can
continue to operate, the proceeds from the same collateral, in
finished form, may pay off the loan.
A partial rearrangement of the parties' rights and duties often
may appear to either debtor, creditors, or both to be a more practi-
cal solution to this problem. The forms of rearrangement avail-
able are as varied as their causes. A bank or supplier, for
example, may simply extend the maturity date of a debt due it,
leaving other creditors undisturbed. Another alternative to a for-
mal reorganization is an out-of-court agreement, with all or most
of the creditors, to extend the time of payment and possibly re-
duce the amount of debt. If obtaining consent of every creditor is
recognized by the creditors as a near impossibility, the body of
creditors may agree to extend the time of payment if a certain
high percentage of debt holders-85 percent, for example-will
consent. The workout agreement may permit the debtor to pay
the remaining 15 percent of its creditors now in cash, or in a
shorter time period than it pays the assenters, on time. Since ob-
taining the agreement of each creditor is often crucial, the success
of this out-of-court alternative is often directly related to the
number of creditors involved. With a modest number of creditors,
obtaining voluntary consent of each creditor may be practical. If,
however, there are many parties involved, the debtor, creditors, or
both frequently prefer a proceeding under the federal bankruptcy
law because they can use the statutory forcing power which, with
what generally are mild limitations, permits the statutory majority
of a creditor or equity class to bind the nonassenting minority.39
In some situations, an otherwise financially healthy debtor
may need only temporary relief from creditor harassment. Some
38. See Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. v. Louisville Trust Co., 174 U.S. 552
(1899).
39. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (Supp. III 1979); Coogan, Broude & Glatt, supra note 27,
at 1154. For our use of the term "statutory majority" see infra text accompanying notes
146-48.
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reorganization specialists consider that the relief from creditor
harassment created by the stay is one of the more important as-
pects of a bankruptcy filing. The casting of an umbrella over the
debtor and his assets gives time for voluntary rearrangements.
Such relief is created automatically by filing a petition, and it is
obtained through a section 362 stay.40 When possible to obtain it,
voluntary restraint on the creditors' part is ideal.4 ' The temporary
stay or restraint may lead to extending the time of payment.
At the other end of the spectrum, reorganization might involve
a merger with a financially stronger entity42 which may entail a
major shift in control of the entity. If the financial difficulty in-
volves only unpaid dividend arrearages, recapitalization or rear-
rangement of the stock structure may cure the problem. A plan
under section 1123 of the Bankruptcy Code might involve one or
more of these elements and much more.43 Thus, a reorganization
may be analogous to an individual's recovery from a bad case of
flu, a minor operation, or a near fatal illness. The cost of the dis-
aster may be taken in stride by creditors and the debtor alike or it
may almost kill the patient-debtor economically, and the best ar-
rangement that can be worked out may be costly to creditors. If
economic damage already has occurred, a reorganization may
stop further damage, but it seldom can do better than to divide the
existing loss between the different classes of holders of claims and
interests and to keep the debtor alive with hope for a better day.
III. CHAPTERS X AND XI OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT-THE
PREDECESSORS OF NEW CHAPTER 1
To understand the new chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, it
would be helpful to understand the strengths and weaknesses of
its grandparent, the equity receivership, under which most reorga-
nizations were affected during the last half of the nineteenth and
first third of the twentieth century.
It is helpful, and perhaps necessary, to understand the ele-
ments of the two principal direct predecessors of chapter
11--chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act. These two chap-
ters, which differed drastically between themselves in philosophy
and method, became part of the Bankruptcy Act in 1938 when the
40. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (Supp. III 1979).
41. Out-of-court compositions or stand-still agreements are not uncommon, particu-
larly in some industries.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(C) (Supp. III 1979).
43. See generally id. §1129(b).
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Chandler Act became law." Chapter X throughout shows the in-
fluence of the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC); chapter XI does not. In a way, however, the two chapters
were sponsored unofficially by the then fairly recently constituted
National Bankruptcy Conference.45 Each chapter, however, had
its own draftsmen and advocates who approached the problem in
the light of their different practices.46
Partisans of former chapter XI are wont to say that new chap-
ter 11 discards too much of old chapter XI. Some authorities, par-
ticularly academic experts, may think that chapter X has been
weakened too much. A case can be made for either position. In
any event, it is necessary to have some understanding of what
these two chapters were like. While a confirmation under section
1129(a) in many ways resembles the confirmation of a plan of ar-
rangement under old chapter XI, parts of old chapter X show
themselves even in this section 1129(a) confirmation by consent of
each impaired class. Chapter X is more fully revived, though
again with modifications, in a confirmation where one class does
not consent and the debtor, with or without cooperation of a ma-
jority of the other classes, forces it to accept something which the
judge finds is the fair equivalent of what they now hold in rights.
A. Former Chapter X
The principal objective of chapter X, when it was drafted in
the later 1930's, was to correct the ostensible deficiencies in section
77B 7-a section which in the earlier 1930's had been created to
remedy the real or alleged deficiencies of the federal equity receiv-
44. See supra note 4. For a lucid description of the history of chapters X and XI, see
Rostow & Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate Reorganization: Chapters Xand XI of the
BankruptcyAct, 48 YALE L.J. 1334 (1939).
45. The National Bankruptcy Conference is an unofficial body composed of practi-
tioners and scholars of debtor-creditor law. The members of the conference occasionally
are consulted by appropriate congressional committees. While the members may help in
drafting, the committee has the last say.
For example, spokesmen for the National Bankruptcy Conference presented a memo-
randum recommending that Congress make the bankruptcy courts full-fledged Article III
courts after the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982). While the Supreme Court held that Congress had
gone too far in giving the bankruptcy courts certain powers reserved to the Article III
courts by the Constitution, the Court delayed the effective date of its opinion to allow
Congress a chance to remedy the unconstitutional aspects of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978.
46. Rostow & Cutler, supra note 44, at 1341.
47. Id. at 1338.
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ership system.4 The staff of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission played a significant role in establishing the philosophy of
chapter X.4 9 William 0. Douglas was an influential participant.
The SEC staff was critical of the part which the old management
played in equity receiverships. Management usually represented
stock interests. The SEC staff was also critical of the part played
by the corporation's investment bankers. The staff thought that
stockholders had too much influence, while creditors, especially
senior creditors, had too little influence in formulating a reorgani-
zation plan. It apparently was assumed that bonds were likely to
be held largely by holders who were both scattered and unsophis-
ticated, while stocks tended to be held by insiders. Furthermore,
the SEC staff thought that the equity receiver, often a former of-
ficer of the debtor, would be reluctant to investigate responsibility
for the corporation's financial problems since he was once associ-
ated with its management. A plan devised by the receiver would
likely favor the class the receiver was thought to have represented.
Equity receivership law was entirely case law and necessarily left
many problems unresolved.
To remedy these and other defects, chapter X was devised as a
complete reorganization vehicle. A plan under chapter X could
modify all kinds of claims-secured and unsecured, fixed and
contingent. Changes in rights of stockholders as well as creditors
could be affected to meet the real or imagined management con-
trol problem and the necessary shifts of equity ownership. Chap-
ter X relieved management not only of major responsibilities for
formulation of the plan, but also for the current operations of the
debtor,50 except that the independent trustee might engage serv-
ices of some officers. Not only the debtor's management, but also
its counsel were replaced by the judge's appointees. The chapter
X reorganization process became the responsibility of the federal
district judge who would designate a "disinterested" trustee51
who, in turn, would receive advice from "disinterested" counsel.52
In keeping with the philosophy of the times, therefore, crucial de-
cisions were shifted away from the then unpopular business man-
agers and entrepreneurs. In short, the trustee had the
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1335.
50. Chapter X required the appointment of a disinterested trustee when indebtedness
was greater than $250,000. FED. R. BANKR. P. 10- 202.
51. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 1(156), 52 Stat. 840, 888. For the definition of a
disinterested person, see id. § 1(158).
52. Id. § 1(157).
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responsibility of discovering any management wrongdoing, super-
vising the operations of business, and eventually formulating a
plan. The trustee might listen to some creditors, but subject to
control by the judge, supervision was his responsibility.53
The disinterested trustee, by definition, initially was ignorant
of the corporation's affairs and was required, therefore, to learn on
the job. Creditors were fearful that too much of this stranger's
time would be spent looking for the devil who caused the financial
crisis rather than thinking about changes in the firm's production
or marketing decisions, its financial structure, or remedies
designed to alleviate its financial difficulties. After their investiga-
tion of past management's sins, however, much time of the trustee
and his counsel was devoted to an involved process of determin-
ing the future earnings and, therefore, the present value of the
firm. From this determination, these individuals hoped a plan of
reorganization would emerge. Only after the judge's tentative ap-
proval of the plan could it be submitted to creditors and stock-
holders for their acceptance or rejection.54
Even if holders of two-thirds in amount and number of each
class affected by the plan accepted it, under old chapter X, a judge
could not confirm a plan until he made an independent determi-
nation that the plan was "fair and equitable, and feasible.""
Finding that the plan was "feasible" required the creation of a
capital structure which would not crumble from the weight of its
own fixed charges in a future financial storm.56 Finding a plan
fair and equitable usually meant that every holder of a claim or
equity interest would have received full compensation in the order
of his contract priorities before any member of the class below his
class was allowed any participation in the reorganized corpora-
tion. Approval of the statutory two-thirds of the class did not ex-
cuse the judge from making a fair and equitable finding. The
53. See the monumental Securities and Exchange Commission Report of the Study
and Investigation of Protective and Reorganization Committees (1936-1939). Chapter X
reflected the New Deal attitude decrying the malefactors of great wealth whose financial
machinations brought about the debtor's troubles. Practitioners in the reorganization field
generally agree that bad luck, bad judgment-even stupidity-were and are found to be
causes of financial disaster much more frequently than a breach of trust. Experienced
credit men are likely to think of a moral breakdown of a person who ordinarily is honest as
a result, not a cause, of financial trouble.
54. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 1(174), 52 Stat. 840, 891. The classic exposition
is that of Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939). See infra notes
57, 118-21 and accompanying text.
55. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 1(221)(2), 52 Stat. 840, 897.
56. 5 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11.07 (15th ed. 1979).
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words "fair and equitable" were so interpreted by Justice Doug-
las, writing for the Court in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products
CoY' Two years later, in Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du-
Bois,58 the Supreme Court required a valuation of the reorganized
corporation based primarily on its probable estimated future earn-
ings in a typical year to make the fair and equitable determina-
tion. That earnings estimate was then multiplied by a suitable
times earnings multiple to produce an entity valuation. 9
Until the Supreme Court's ruling in Ecker v. Western Pacfc
Railroad Corp.,6" it was thought that the two-step entity valuation
process of Consolidated Rock Products was the only permissible
method to fix reorganization value, as distinguished from liquida-
tion value. A present valuation based on estimated future earn-
ings necessarily involves crystal ball gazing into the future, with
limited help from past earnings performance and modifications of
those earnings hopefully influenced by the debtor's cure from its
financial ills, predictable changes in the industry, and changes in
the reorganized entity's operations. The desired result was, ac-
cording to Justice Douglas in Consolidated Rocks Products, an ed-
ucated guess. 6' The valuation was not necessarily a statement of
the entity's present earnings or present market value, but rather,
what its earnings and values would be should it recover from the
trauma of reorganization, perhaps two or three years hence.
Although abstractly this two-step method may have been and
still is the best method available, it does have make-believe char-
acteristics.62 Estimating earnings of a healthy company for several
57. 308 U.S. 106 (1939). It is not easy to trace the history of the "fair and equitable"
phrase. The Court cites railroad receivership cases as authority for the meaning of the
phrase. Although none of the cited cases used that exact phrase, the Court concluded that
"the phrase became a term of art used to indicate that a plan of reorganization fulfilled the
necessary standards of fairness." Id. at 118.
58. 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
59. Id. at 526.
60. 318 U.S. 448 (1942).
61. 312 U.S. at 526.
62. Gardner, The SEC and Valuation Under Chapter X, 91 U. PA. L. REv. 440, 451
(1943). Gardner's article can be regarded as the classic exposition of the doctrine at the
time it was written.
See H.R. REP. No. 595,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 222, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 6181: "As Peter Coogan has aptly noted, such a valuation is usually 'a guess
compounded by an estimate.'" The report later notes, "The process, however, is inherently
uncertain. Professor Peter Coogan frequently has referred to [the earnings estimate valua-
tion] as 'an estimate compounded by a guess."' Id. at 225, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 6184. I frequently have been asked which statement is mine. My reply is that I
could have said either, or both, or neither.
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years in the future is difficult enough; adding the cost of recovery
by a business almost sure to have had losses for perhaps several
years back complicates the practice. Under this method, for ex-
ample, various creditor and equity classes would argue for a result
that favored the interests of their class. Senior classes who
thought that all or most of the corporate assets belonged to them
would argue for low future earnings, a low earnings multiple and,
consequently, a low capitalized earnings value. If each senior
class were compensated fully by the issuance of securities under
the plan, the total entity value produced by the low earnings esti-
mate would thereby be exhausted. The process would result in a
capital structure which would allow for little or no participation
by junior interests.
In contrast, spokesmen for the junior interests, who hoped to
retain some or all of their interest in the reorganized corporation,
would present witnesses to support higher earnings estimates or a
higher earnings multiple, or both, to justify retention of some or
all of the junior interest. Ultimately, the decision as to which
earnings estimates and which multiple to use would be made by
the judge and not by the interested parties. (The creditors, how-
ever, had the last chance since they could accept or reject the
plan.) The valuation, and the determination of which classes
could participate in the reorganized entity, would follow. An esti-
mate of $1,765,500, for example, gives an illusion of certainty
where none could exist. A valuation based on applying a 10% cap-
italization rate to $17,650,500, for instance, creates the same illu-
sion. The valuation remains, at best, an educated guess, and
perhaps an uneducated guess.
The judge's valuation set a ceiling on the amount of securities
which the reorganized corporation could issue. The absolute pri-
ority rule of chapter X required that each class be compensated
fully before any junior class could participate. If the senior class
prevailed in establishing its future earnings estimate and/or a low
earnings multiple, the absolute priority rule would reduce or elim-
inate junior interests, beginning with stockholders and continuing
in inverse order according to the priority of the different classes of
investors. (If one could be certain as to valuation, it would be
hard to argue that contract rights of the classes should not be
respected.)
The requirement that the judge find the plan to be feasible
would prevent an all secured debt structure or, for that matter, an
all senior capital structure. To avoid too much debt, senior classes
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might be given some or all of their compensation in junior securi-
ties. It often was necessary, therefore, to downgrade the quality of
the securities issued to old prior classes to prevent the capital
structure from becoming an economic monstrosity. Since a thou-
sand-dollar par value of common stock is not the equivalent of a
thousand-dollar bond, the decrease- in the quality demanded an
increase in the quantity of a lower grade security to be given to the
higher priority class.
This adjustment further reduced what was left for junior
classes. Often the reorganization values would have been ex-
hausted before the junior class was reached. The new capital
structure must be kept within the feasibility aspect of the "fair,
equitable and feasible" requirement.63 If, for example, earnings
prospects did not justify participation by holders of common stock
but did justify participation by the holders of preferred stock, the
latter class probably would get most of the new common stock.
The valuation process could continue so long that a sick entity
could not survive. Practitioners in the reorganization area had se-
rious doubts that a valuation reached by this process necessarily
produced a more satisfactory result than that which would have
been reached if the interested classes had negotiated a settlement
as businessmen normally determine values when they buy or sell a
business.
For good reasons or bad, neither creditors nor debtors made
great use of chapter X. The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws
of the United States observed in its 1973 Report "that Chapter XI
has evolved into the dominant reorganization vehicle." 64 The
draftsmen of chapter 11 were influenced, no doubt, by the prefer-
ence of the market for the simpler, if theoretically less accurate,
procedures of chapter XI.
B. Former Chapter XI
While chapter X was being drafted by one group of members
of the National Bankruptcy Conference (largely reflecting the
practice under the old equity receivership and section 77B as well
63. See, ag., Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac.
K.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943). The phrase used in § 1(221) of the act was "fair and equitable
and feasible." In the code, the two concepts are separated: "fair and equitable" appears in
§ 1129(b)(1) and is applicable only when a plan is forced on a rejecting class. The "feasi-
bility" test, under § 1129(a)(11) applies to every confirmation.
64. H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. pt. 1, at 246 (1973). Seeinfra note-71 for
statistics proving the preference for chapter XI filing.
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as the influence of Justice Douglas and the SEC staff),6  another
group of members, whose experience and outlook were quite dif-
ferent, drafted a dissimilar piece of legislation--chapter XI. This
latter group of draftsmen typically represented trade creditors or
their small and medium sized debtors. These lawyers were famil-
iar, therefore, with common law compositions and Sections 12 and
74 of the Bankruptcy Act.66 The draftsmen of Chaper XI did not
purport to cover the entire corporate reorganization area. Not
every kind of debt was affected-some kinds of debt were not dis-
chargeable. Chapter XI made no provision for altering secured
claims or equity interests. Who would decide whether the debtor's
plan was satisfactory better than the parties concerned? Since each
secured party was likely to be in a class by himself, approval by a
majority in amount and number often was not meaningful.
Draftsmen with a background of nonstatutory or statutory
workouts could not be expected to be enthusiastic about at least
two features which became part of chapter X. The first feature
was the appointment of a disinterested trustee to operate the busi-
ness. This arrangement, for example, made no sense for a small to
medium sized retail entity-a "mom and pop" store, more com-
mon in the late 1930's than now. Creditors depended on the rela-
tionships between management and its customers for continuing
operations, and without continued operations, the debtor could
not pay. Replacement of management often would end the busi-
ness. Who other than an owner, hoping to revive the business,
would "keep store" nights and Sundays? There was also probably
no money to pay for an independent trustee, even if the old cus-
tomers would accept one.
Another feature which must have been objectionable to the
draftsmen of chapter XI was the stipulation that the stockholders
could retain their equity interest only if the creditors first were
compensated fully. In many rearrangements, some class of credi-
tors, and sometimes every class, will be less than fully compen-
sated. If a class with payment due now is to be paid in the future,
some rights are taken away from the class, and under chapter X,
this loss would require compensation at the expense of the stock-
holder. This requirment of chapter X-that each creditor be com-
pensated fully before shareholders could participate in the
reorganized entity-often would have entailed the transfer of part,
65. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 33.
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and sometimes all, of the stockholders' equity interest to the credi-
tors. Was it realistic for creditors to expect the debtor to pull the
entity out of its financial hole for the prime benefit of his creditors
and retain little or no equity for himself? Trade creditors were
generally philosophical about giving up something to the debtor.
Without owner-management, there was no equity for the creditors
to take over. And if, as was not too infrequent, the situation was
such that the creditors were entitled to a share of the equity in
return for the sacrifices which they were asked to make, who could
decide better than the parties themselves what the division would
be? Creditors could refuse to vote for a plan which did not com-
pensate them for their sacrifice.
The chapter XI draftsmen began, therefore, with quite differ-
ent premises than did the chapter X draftsmen. Under the drafts-
men's "plan of arrangement,"67 the debtor remained in control of
the enterprise, management was not ousted, and a trustee was not
appointed. The debtor began with the assumption that he could
retain all or much of his equity; he entered into a composition,
which if approved by a majority of unsecured creditors, would
either reduce the amount of unsecured debt or postpone the time
of payment, or both. The share of equity ownership to be trans-
ferred to the creditors was a bargaining point between the debtor
and his creditors. If a majority in amount and number of un-
secured creditors approved an arrangement, regardless of whether
the creditors were compensated fully, the judge would have been
required to confirm the arrangement if satisfied as to two major
conditions: the arrangement had to be both feasible and "in the
best interest of creditors." Basically, the test largely meant that
the creditors had to receive at least as much as they would have
received if the enterprise had been liquidated.68
After the enactment of chapters X and XI, the commentators
rated chapter X as the fair-haired child and chapter XI as the poor
stepsister.69 If, however, the value of an idea is determined by its
acceptance or rejection in the marketplace,70 then these early com-
mentators were wrong. After all, the statistics prove that chapter
67. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 1(306), 52 Stat. 840, 906.
68. Id. § 1(366), 52 Stat. at 911. This specific language read, "it [the arrangement] is
for the best interests of the creditors... ." Id. That language has been interpreted, when
compared with the former § 12(d), to mean that a plan which paid creditors less than they
might expect to receive in liquidation, was a plan not in the best interests of the creditors. 9
W. COLLIER, s'upra note 56, 1 9.17.
69. See Rostow & Cutler, supra note 45, at 1334.
70. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
1982]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [
XI has been the predominant vehicle for corporate reorganization
for several decades." Chapter XI's relative simplicity and credi-
tor-debtor direct bargaining may explain its popularity with both
creditors and debtors.7" The time-consuming adversary process
was considerably shortened and often eliminated under chapter
XI. In contrast, the complex procedures of chapter X, almost ne-
cessitating the adversary process, deterred both debtors and credi-
tors because its mechanics consumed too much of the time that
was critical to the life of the corporation.7 3 Even a good plan may
fail if its help is delayed too long.
The necessity for the appointment of a trustee in almost all
chapter X cases and its absence in chapter X174 further increased
the desirability of chapter XI. It is too much to expect that corpo-
rate executives and directors would rush to file under chapter X
where filing almost certainly would result in their replacement by
a trustee not of their choosing. Except in rare cases, the corporate
7 1. The number of bankruptcy filings under chapter XI and X are as follows:
YEAR CHAPTER XI FILINGS CHAPTER X FILINGS
1940 990 320
1950 583 134
1960 622 90
1970 1,262 115
1973 1,458 101
1974 2,171 163
1975 3,506 189
1976 3,235 141
1977 3,046 96
1978 3,266 75
1979 3,042 63
See, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 539 (102d ed. 1981).
See also ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, TABLES OF BANK-
RUPTCY STATISTICS, published annually.
72. Unsecured creditors under chapter XI could choose to demand stock participation
as compensation for decreases in amount or deferral of the time of payment. If creditors
demanded participation and the debtor refused, the creditors could reject the plan. This
type of leverage frequently gave creditors some stock interest in return for accepting a plan
which altered their rights. As for secured creditors and stockholders, there was no provi-
sion for the alteration of their rights. Changes in capital stock structure were made under
state corporation law. Changes in secured claims and stock interests, therefore, frequently
were made by contract between the debtor and each secured creditor. See, e.g., S. REP.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787.
73. "The primary problem posed by Chapter X is delay. . . . Over and over again, it
is demonstrated that corporations which must avail themselves of the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act suffer appreciable deterioration if they are caught in a Chapter X proceed-
ing for any substantial period of time." 124 CONG. REC. S 17,418 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978)
(remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
74. See Bankruptcy Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 1(156), 52 Stat. 840, 888. See also id. ch.
575, § 1(44), 52 Stat. at 860; H.R. 8046, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
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officials would rather retain control of the debtor's business and
the reorganization plan, as provided in chapter XI, than be re-
placed by a disinterested trustee whose identity, to say nothing of
his qualifications, could not be known until it was too late for the
executives and directors to change their choice of remedy. Simi-
larly, creditors seemingly preferred to negotiate with interested
parties directly instead of entrusting their fate to an unknown
trustee. Creditors also might have preferred to negotiate directly
with equity owners for an interest in the new entity, rather than
leaving it to the judge to determine, under a fair and equitable
analysis of the plan, that junior classes should or should not be
allowed to continue to participate in the enterprise.75
Chapter XI, however, had serious shortcomings, particularly
when used for cases for which it was not designed-the debtor
with substantial assets and many security holders. Chapter XI had
no provisions by which a minority of any class other than un-
secured creditors could be bound by a majority and no provisions
to bind a class which had not accepted the plan; furthermore, cer-
tain debts were not dischargeable. The terms of secured debt
could be changed only by contract with each holder. Chapter XI
gave no power to alter rights of shareholders.
These defects prompted the National Bankruptcy Conference
to appoint a committee in the early 1960's to determine whether
changes should be made in chapters X and XI. I was a member
and acted as secretary of that committee. The committee dis-
cussed the need for a more structured reorganization scheme for
what were called "middle size" entities than the one available in
chapter XI but a less structured scheme than that of chapter X.
Soon dubbed the "Chapter X 1/2 Committee," the members con-
sidered whether these changes should be made by tightening
chapter XI's provisions, loosening chapter X's provisions, or creat-
ing a new chapter. Before the issue was resolved, however, the
matter was removed in effect from the jurisdiction of the commit-
tee with the appointment of a congressional commission to study
the bankruptcy laws.76 In 1972, that commission recommended a
change in reorganization law and prepared a draft which served
75. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 1(174), 52 Stat. 840, 891. "[Tihe judge shall
enter an order approving the plan or plans which in his opinion... are fair and equitable,
and feasible, and shall fix a time within which the creditors and stockholders affected may
accept the same." Id.
76. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 established the Commission
on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.
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as a starting point for what became part of the Bankruptcy Code
about six years later.77
IV. CHAPTER 11: PRINCIPLE CHANGES IN REORGANIZATION
Today, reorganization of almost any business, regardless of
size, can be conducted under chapter 11 if the entity is not entirely
excluded from any form of relief under the Bankruptcy Code.
Since financial institutions, such as banks, savings and loan as-
sociations, and insurance companies cannot be debtors under
chapter 7, they also are excluded under chapter 11.78 State law
generally provides for liquidation of these financial institutions.
Although interstate railroads are excluded from chapter 7 liquida-
tions, these corporations can be dealt with under a separate sub-
chapter of chapter 11 (to which only this passing reference is made
in this Article).79 Contrariwise, the liquidation of stock and com-
modity brokers is provided for in subchapters III and IV of chap-
ter 7, but they are excluded from a chapter 11 reorganization or
liquidation. Apparently, Congress was convinced that financial
failure of a broker destroyed that which reorganization is intended
to save-going concern value.8 0
A review of some of the principal changes in the law will illus-
trate how chapter 11 follows parts of chapters X, where it follows
chapter XI, and where it breaks new ground. Unlike old chapters
X and XI, the relief available under new chapter 11 generally is
not influenced by the character of the debtor unless it is in a class
entirely excluded from the Bankruptcy Code. While only a corpo-
ration could be a debtor under chapter X,8 1 a chapter 11 petition
may be filed by or against an individual, partnership, corporation,
or almost any other entity.82 Almost any person who qualifies for
a chapter 7 liquidation can become a debtor under chapter 11. 83
Another principal change resulting from chapter lI's enact-
77. For information regarding the commission's recommendations and rationales, see
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess. pt. 1, supra note 64. See also W. COLLIER, supra
note 56, 1100.01[1], [2]; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprintedin 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787.
78. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b), (d) (Supp. III 1979).
79. Id. §§ 1161-1174.
80. See id. §§ 741-752.
81. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 1(106)(5), 52 Stat. 840, 883.
82. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b), (d) (Supp. III 1979).
83. Id. § 109(a) provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, only a
person that resides in the United States, or has a domicile, a place of business, or property
in the United States, or a municipality, may be a debtor under this title." Id. § 109(d),
relating to chapter 11, provides: "Only a person that may be a debtor under chapter 7 of
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ment concerns the nature of the debt, including limits on its dis-
chargeability. In this area, chapter 11 is patterned after chapter X
rather than chapter XI. While chapter XI could affect only un-
secured debt and contained limits on dischargeability, 84 chapter X
could affect any type of debt or equity interest.85 For this reason,
a debtor sometimes chose chapter X primarily to receive the bene-
fits of greater dischargeability.86
Under chapter 11, however, debt and equity interests may be
altered and all debts may be discharged except those listed in sec-
tion 114187 or in the actual plan. Failure to file a claim, therefore,
does not prevent discharge. 8
New chapter 11 also follows in the footsteps of chapter X re-
garding who may file a petition for relief. Chapter 11, somewhat
like chapter X, allows either the debtor or the debtor's creditors
(ordinarily three or more) to file a petition for relief.8 9 Only the
debtor, however, has a period of exclusivity.90 In contrast, chapter
XI permitted voluntary filings by the debtor and permitted no
filings by the creditors.9" Thus, there were situations under the act
where the creditors, who would have preferred another plan under
chapter XI, had to choose among the available alternatives: they
could convince the debtor that he should change the plan; they
could file for an involuntary liquidation under the act; they could
make (as to a corporation only) an involuntary filing under chap-
ter X; they could convince enough unsecured creditors to reject
the plan; or they could simply let the debtor drift. Often, none of
these alternatives were satisfactory.
Chapter 11 also varies from its predecessors with respect to the
this title, except a stockholder or a commodity broker, and a railroad may be a debtor
under chapter 11 of this title."
84. See 5 W. COLLIER, supra note 56, 1 1100.01[l].
85. Id.
86. Id. 1 1141.01[l].
87. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a)(2), (3) (Supp. III 1979). Section 1141(a)(2) provides that the
confirmation of a plan does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt excepted
from discharge under § 523. Section 1141(a)(3) states:
The confirmation of a plan does not discharge a debtor if--(A) the plan provides
for the liquidation of all or substantially all the property of the estate; (B) the
debtor does not engage in business after the consummation of the plan; and (C)
the debtor would be denied a discharge under section 727(a) of this title if the case
were a case under chapter 7 of this title.
88. 5 W. COLLIER, supra note 56, 1141.01[4].
"89. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303(a), (b), 1121 (Supp. III 1979).
90. Id. § 1121(b). Only the debtor may file a plan until 120 days after the date of the
order for relief.
91. See supra note 84.
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appointment of a trustee.92 Under chapter X of the Bankruptcy
Act, the appointment of a disinterested trustee was mandatory for
any case of significant size.93 This trustee operated the business
and was responsible for the formulation of a plan. Under chapter
XI, however, the debtor was the only person who could file a plan
and ordinarily he was left in possession; occasionally, a receiver
was appointed.94 Under new chapter 11, as was true under old
chapter XI, the debtor is ordinarily left in possession.9 5 A trustee's
appointment occurs only at the request of a "party in interest,"
and only where there has been fraud, incompetence, or like cause;
or, where such appointment is "in the interest of creditors or eq-
uity holders."9 6 Under section 1106, an examiner may be ap-
pointed to perform the investigatory function similar to that of a
chapter X trustee.
It is fair to assume that the parties in interest usually will not
request a trustee under chapter 11. Their preference for a debtor
in possession is indicated by their preference for chapter 11. Thus,
in this regard, chapter 11 more closely parallels chapter XI. And,
in the case where a trustee is appointed at the request of a party,
the appointment may be terminated, restoring the debtor to
possession.97
The administrative role of the judge in what is expected to be
the normal chapter 11 case--one in which confirmation of a plan
is based on approval of the statutory majority of each impaired
class-may be limited indeed. The judge appoints a creditor's
committee at an early stage; he need only satisfy himself on a
limited number of points before confirmation. In any case where
the parties fail to agree, a party in interest may ask the judge to
decide any number of issues. Where acceptance by a majority of
each class cannot be obtained, the role of the judge is increased,
but even then his responsibility with respect to the accepting
classes is limited.
The SEC's role also has been reduced under the new chapter
11. The judge in a chapter X proceeding could request the SEC to
92. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (Supp. III 1979).
93. FED. R. BANKR. P. 10-202. This rule raised the statutory amount in regard to
trustee appointment to $250,000; few chapter X cases involved less than this amount.
94. Rothchild, Liability Incurred by a Receiver or Trustee in Bankruptcy Conducting a
Business, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 520, 521 (1964).
95. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104-1108 (Supp. III 1979).
96. Id. § 1104(a).
97. Id. § 1105.
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report on any plan submitted by the court.98 These reports, which
were frequently exhaustive, served as guidance for the trustee and
judge. A comprehensive report by persons theretofore unfamiliar
with the case, however, took precious time. Further, the report
was one more act which removed the solution from the direct re-
sponsibility of the parties concerned. Under chapter 11, the SEC
is not responsible for making such reports to the judge. The SEC
may be heard on any issue, however, but it is denied the right to
appeal.99
The new chapter 11 accords the debtor or creditors the right to
convert a chapter 11 reorganization into a chapter 7 liquidation." °
The debtor's power is subject to limitations; he can convert only if
he is a debtor in possession.'' If an involuntary petition is filed
by creditors under chapter 11, or they convert their chapter 7 pro-
ceeding to a chapter 11 proceeding, the debtor has no power to
convert to chapter 7.102 Either the debtor or the creditors, how-
ever, may move to transfer from a chapter 7 proceeding to a pro-
ceeding under chapter 11.103
In situations where the debtor is not in possession and initially
could have been subjected to an involuntary chapter 7 liquidation,
creditors may request the court either to convert a chapter 11 reor-
ganization into a chapter 7 liquidation or dismiss the case.' °4 Sec-
tion 1112(b) enumerates the reasons for dismissal which include
the unlikelihood of any reorganization being accomplished, con-
tinued loss to the estate, and undue delay in effectuating a plan. 05
Under chapter X, the trustee initially had the duty of formulat-
ing a plan, though others could make suggestions. 1°6 Eventually,
a creditor could file his own plan.0 7 Under chapter XI, however,
only the debtor could file a plan. Creditors could influence the
debtor's plan by making it plain to the debtor that a plan with
certain features would not obtain the necessary majority vote for
98. FED. R. BANKR. P. 10-303(b).
99. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (Supp. III 1979).
100. Id. § 11l2(a).
101. Id. § 1112(a)(1).
102. Id. § 1112(a)(2), (3).
103. See id. §§ 11 12(a)-(b), 706. Under § 1112(a), the debtor may convert unless the
debtor does not have possession, the case is an involuntary case originally commenced
under chapter 11, or the case was converted previously to a chapter 11 case by someone
other than a debtor. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. § 1112(b).
106. FED. R. BANKR. P. 10-301.
107. Id.
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confirmation, but the debtor had the sole right to present a plan of
arrangement.
There are other ways in which chapter 11 follows and modifies
parts of chapter XI, and sometimes, chapter X. Under section
1121,108 the debtor has an exclusive right to file a plan, but unlike
his perpetual exclusivity under chapter XI, this right exists only
for a limited period of time. If a trustee has not been appointed,
the debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan within 120 days of
the relief order.10 9 If the debtor files a plan within the 120-day
period, another 60 days remain to obtain acceptances." 0
The judge may extend or shorten the 120-day or 180-day peri-
ods at the request of a party in interest after notice and hearing."I
In a situation where the debtor does not meet the 120- day or 180-
day limit or where a trustee has been appointed, a party in interest
(including creditors, the trustee, the debtor, and the security hold-
ers' committee) may file a plan.
Under chapter XI, only the debtor could fie a plan of arrange-
ment. Since a plan under chapter XI could "affect" only un-
secured claims, secured creditors had no vote; any secured
creditor could agree or not agree as to a change in his rights but
not the rights of his class (if there were other members). Under
the code, a statutory majority may control any class, secured or
unsecured creditors, or equity owners, if each other class is some-
how to be bound, subject to compliance with certain general pro-
visions of chapter 11. Assuming, for simplicity, one class of
unsecured claims, the chapter XI plan could be approved under
former section 362(1) by holders of a majority in number and
amount of unsecured claims.
Under chapter 11, secured creditors and equity holders also
can be impaired, and if so, they also would vote. Instead of a
majority in number and amount, chapter 11, in section 1129(a)(8),
requires a "statutory majority" (as herein defined) of each class
for approval. Sections 1126(c) and (d) require holders of two-
thirds in amount and more than half in number" 2 (except that for
equity interests the numbers test does not apply). At least one
class of claims must accept under section 1129(a)(10)."13 The plan
108. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (Supp. III 1979).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. § 1121(d).
112. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
113. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
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proponent under new chapter 11 has a higher hurdle to jump to
obtain confirmation through class acceptance, and contrariwise,
an opposing group can more readily prevent approval. A nonas-
senter may defeat the plan if he can prevent the proponent from
obtaining the required two-thirds in amount or more than one
half in number vote. Unlike a creditor under chapter XI, any
holder of a claim or interest under chapter 11 can file his own plan
(after a period of exclusivity for the debtor) and can have the plan
approved over the debtor's opposition if he can muster the needed
statutory majority.1 4 The debtor or other plan proponent who has
failed to obtain the requisite majority may be able, under the
fairly stringent provisions of section 1129(b), to obtain confirma-
tion if the judge can make certain findings.
Whether on balance, chapter 11 favors the debtor or creditors
is not readily answered. The change made by section 1121, which
allows a creditor to file a plan in addition to the creditors' right to
file a section 303(b) petition," 5 supports those who claim that new
chapter 11 removes some of the debtor's previous advantages
under old chapter XI. 16 On the other hand, these changes molli-
fied creditors who charged that old chapter XI unduly favored the
debtor since it gives the debtor the sole right to file a petition and
a plan. 1 7
Chapter 1 's most significant aspect is the provision contained
within section 1129(a) which reduces the role of the judge in the
proceeding where the statutory majority of each impaired class
approves under section 1129(a)(8). This provision is not in keep-
ing with the standards of chapter X. It is more like chapter XI
which did not require a judge to determine whether the plan is
fair and equitable as to a member of any class when the statutory
majority of each unsecured class had consented to the plan.
Chapter 11 almost reversed Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod-
ucts Co. ,1I" a landmark decision which held that chapter X's pred-
ecessor, section 77B, imposed a two-fold requirement on the
114. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126(c), 1121(c) (Supp. I1 1979).
115. Id. § 303(b).
116. See generally Moiler & Foltz, Chapter 11 ofthe 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 58 N.C.L.
Rv. 881 (1980). As to an earlier bill, see Weintraub & Crames, Critique of Chapter VII
andRelated Sections of the Proposed BankruptcyAct of 1973,48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1974).
117. See Brudney, The Bankruptcy Commission's Proposed "Modcations" oftheAbso-
lute PriorityRule, 48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 305 (1974). Many changes were made in the sections
discussed after Professor Brudney's article was written. See I 1 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (Supp. III
1979).
118. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
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confirmation of a plan: First, the plan must be approved by the
requisite majority; and second, the judge must find independently
that the plan was "fair and equitable, and feasible.""' 9 Case,
however, was not reversed completely; the fair and equitable re-
quirement survives in section 1129(b), but that situation applies
only where consent of at least one impaired class has not been
obtained. The feasible requirement survives as to every plan in
section 1129(a)(11).
The Case doctrine survives only as to the dissenting class. Sec-
tion 1129(a) of chapter 11, however, requires compliance only
with the first test of Case-acceptance by the statutory majority of
each class whose rights have been impaired. 1 20 In addition to find-
ing that this requirement has been met, the judge must find that
the plan is feasible-another test of that case. Under section
1129(a)(11), the judge must find that the plan is "feasible," as
therein defined. This last requirement is aimed at insuring that
the contemplated reorganization cures the debtor's
problems-that the debtor will not be back for further relief in the
foreseeable future.' 2 1
If, however, the plan proponent cannot meet the test of
1129(a)(8) and a party asks the judge to confirm under section
1129(b)(2), other aspects of Case return to life, but in a limited
manner- only as to reach rejecting class. As to that class, the
judge must be satisfied that the plan is fair and equitable under
the revised standards of 1129(b).
Next, we discuss confirmation under section
1129(a)(8)-through consent of the majority of each impaired
class. Keep in mind the possibility that under section 1129(b), a
plan proponent may be able to have a plan confirmed even if it
does not receive the approval of a majority of each class. Under
that section, a rejecting class can, subject to stringent provisions to
119. Id. at 114. This case involved a nonassenting minority member of a senior class of
bondholders which had accepted the plan by an overwhelming majority. This plan gave
the senior class stock with a par value equal to approximately one-fourth of the bonded
debt and also allowed the stockholders to receive twenty-three percent of the new equity.
The Court stated that the district court was in error in having approved a plan which
allowed equity interests to retain an interest based on "appraisals and audits," while a
senior claimant had not been compensated in full. Id. That plan failed the fair and equita-
ble test of§ 77B and, inferentially, it would have failed the test under its successor, chapter
X. Id. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
120. We here limit our discussion of confirmation requirements to those associated
with Case.
121. See infra text accompanying note 176 for the exact language of section
1129(a)(1 1).
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protect the nonaccepting class, be forced to accept a plan.' 22 This
latter alternative may prove to be more onerous to the plan propo-
nent than to the dissenting class.
There is also a possibility, under one interpretation of sections
1124 and 1126(f), that a plan might be confirmed without the con-
sent of each class because a class is unimpaired, or is treated under
section 1124 as though it were unimpaired, and, under section
1126(f), is "deemed to have accepted" (in effect rendered incapa-
ble of rejecting)."2 That interpretation is rejected by several
cases.' 24 There are also the further questions whether the require-
ment of section 1129(a)(10) for acceptance of a plan by at least
one class would be satisfied by a class which is "deemed to have
accepted" under section 1126(f), 12s and whether a "deemed" ac-
ceptance by a class excuses a vote by that class under section
1129(a)(8)(B).' 26
V. SECTION 1129(a)-CONFIRMATION OF A PLAN OBTAINED
THROUGH THE CONSENT OF EACH CLASS
Chapter 11, like its predecessors, recognizes that one class may
122. This type of forced acceptance, in which the plan is confirmed under § 1129(b)
over the objections of one or more classes, is often called a cramdown. Confirmation under
subsection (b) may be difficult. But see infra note 132. Section 1129(b) requires that a plan
comply with "certain standards of fairness to dissenting creditors or equity security own-
ers." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 413, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5963, 6369.
123. Section 1124 indicates that the contractual rights of a creditor or interest holder
are unimpaired in certain circumstances therein set forth when they are not materially
affected. A class, however, may feel that its rights were impaired even if § 1124 deems it
not to be impaired. For some difficulties in interpreting § 1124, see infra notes 152-62 and
accompanying text. Can a recalcitrant creditor be in effect crammed down because he is
deemed unimpaired in a confirmation under § 1129(a) rather than under § 1129(b)? See
infra 336passim.
124. See, e.g., In re Barrington Oaks Gen. Partnership, 15 Bankr. 952 (D. Utah 1981);
In re Marston Enterprises, Inc., 13 Bankr. 1403 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (section 1129(a)(10) re-
quires that one class of impaired claims must actively accept the plan). But cf. In re Bel Air
Assocs., Ltd., 4 Bankr. 168 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (an unimpaired class counts under
§ 1129(a)(10); the unimpaired creditor has not affirmatively rejected the plan); see also In
re Landau Boat Co., 13 Bankr. 788 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (followed Belir). The abbreviation
Bankr. refers to the West Bankruptcy Reporter 1979 to date, sometimes cited B.R.
Cramdown cases under chapter X have been rare. Much of the law has developed
within the last decade under § 416(11) of chapter XII. Compare Comment, Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978: Chapter 13 Cramdown of the Secured Creditor, 1981 Wis. L. REr. 333.
While a chapter 13 cramdown is not the same as under chapter 11, and in fact, a cramdown
under old chapter XII was not the same as one under chapter X, the chapter 13 discussion
is relevant.
125. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 136 & 150 and accompanying text.
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be entitled to more benefits under the plan than another class.
One class may be secured by collateral which insures full or par-
tial payment and can thereby retain its secured position. Another
class may be accorded priority under section 507127 and thus re-
ceive special treatment under section 1129(a)(9) on confirmation
of a plan. Under section 506(a),' 2 8 a secured creditor has a se-
cured claim, but only to the extent of the collateral's value; any
debt in excess of that value is an unsecured claim. 12 9 By contrast,
one class of secured or unsecured creditors may have
subordinated its right by contract to certain others in favor of an-
other class.'30 Equity interests also may be in different
classes-preferred is prior to common, and one preferred or com-
mon class could be ahead of another.
A. Section 1122-Classifying Claims
An analysis of the confirmation of a plan properly begins with
section 1122 of the code which concerns classifying claims. This
provision states:
Except as provided in subsection (b) . . . a plan may place a
claim or an interest in a particular class only if such claim or
interest is substantially similar to the other claims or interests of
such class.
(b) A plan may designate a separate class of claims consisting
only of every unsecured claim that is less than or reduced to an
amount that the court approves as reasonable and necessary for
administrative convenience.' 3 1
127. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (Supp. III 1979) addresses the priority given to classes of un-
secured creditors to receive their share of the "property of the estate." The available
amount is subject to several qualifications. See infra note 130.
128. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Supp. III 1979).
129. Section 506(a) may involve either a creditor's lien on the debtor's property or the
creditor's right to offset a "mutual debt" owing by the creditor to the debtor. The section
states in pertinent part:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate
has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a se-
cured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's
interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff. . . and
is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the
amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim.
Id.
130. Id. § 510. "A subordinate agreement is enforceable in a case under this title to the
same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law." Id.
131. Id. § 1122. The phrase "substantially similar" means "similar in legal character or
effect as a claim against the debtor's assets or as an interest in the debtor." 5 W. COLLIER,
supra note 56, [ 1122.03. It should be noted that § 506(a) of the code sharpens the distinc-
tion between secured and unsecured claims. Classification under this section is by the na-
ture of the claim rather than the character of the creditors. A secured class, for example,
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Under section 1122(a), determining when a claim or interest is
"substantially similar" to others under subsection (a) is a major
and strategically important task. 132 The extent of the plan propo-
nent's ability to separate or combine certain claims to increase the
chance of obtaining class acceptances is not clear from the statute.
The Preliminary Draft of Proposed New Bankruptcy Rule 3013
makes it clear there must be a hearing before the court's determi-
nation of the classes. 133 A class could be a single holder whose
claim or interest differs from others. It is often easy to determine
when a claim is "substantially similar" to other claims. When, for
example, one thousand persons hold bonds of the same series,
which are issued under the same indenture and which have the
same covenants and maturities, then each of these secured claims
is clearly like the others in the class. 134 Each member of this class
is substantially similar to another but dissimilar to two thousand
persons who hold debentures which are unsecured or which are
governed by and secured under a different indenture.
Under section 1122(b), the plan proponent under the act pos-
sesses some flexibility in classification. That section permits the
proponent to dispose of numerous small claims which otherwise
might be separate classes or fit into different classes. There may
be thousands of small claims against a debtor which, in the aggre-
gate, are insignificant compared to the total claims. A plan propo-
nent may offer a higher percentage of the total claim to the
aggregate class of small claimants than he would offer to the large
claimants, merely to reduce administrative handling. Mr. X, for
example, has a claim of $1,321. As a general unsecured creditor,
the plan will offer him ten percent of this debt in cash and certain
deferred payments, or stock. Under section 1122(b), however, the
may hold a secured claim up to the value of its collateral and an unsecured claim for any
amount by which its total debt is in excess of its secured debt-its deficiency claim.
132. See J.P. Morgan & Co. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 85 F.2d 351, 352 (8th Cir. 1936);
Pachulski, The Cram Down and Valuation Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 58
N.C.L. REv. 925, 930 (1980). The classification of creditors should not depend on the
claimant's nature or his particular bias or experience; rather, it should depend on the na-
ture of the claim. In re Los Angeles Land & Invs., Ltd., 282 F. Supp. 448 (D. Hawaii
1968). A conflicting interest of a member of a class might result in exclusion of his vote
under the good faith test of § I126(e).
133. Pre-Bankruptcy Code cases on classification are not necessarily control-
ling-section 1122 has its own language. The new Bankruptcy Rules, in preliminary form
distributed for comments in March, 1982, do not add much to the statute.
134. See, ag., Schirk v. Newton (In re Rocky Mountain Fuel Co.), 152 F.2d 747 (10th
Cir. 1945) (all creditors of equal rank with claims against the same property should be
placed in the same class).
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plan might offer Mr. X the opportunity to reduce his claim to
$1,000 and be paid seventy percent of that amount on confirma-
tion. Mr. X accepts and receives $700 in cash. A plan proponent,
therefore, may decrease the number of potential holders who will
reject the plan by paying to creditors with relatively small claims
more cash or paying them within a shorter time. To obtain confir-
mation under section 1129(a), classifications of the plan must
comply with the applicable provisions of section 1122.
B. Section 1129-The Importance of the "Class" in a Plan
Confirmation
The concept of a class of holders of claims or interests is im-
portant primarily in the confirmation of a plan under section 1129.
Under section 1129(a)(8), the judge must confirm a plan if it is
accepted by the statutory majority of each class,' 35 and he is satis-
fied that the plan and action of the parties in interest generally
conforms to some fairly mild provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code. 136 This process is more nearly comparable to, but not the
same as, the corresponding practice under old chapter XI and is a
significant departure from that under old chapter X, under which
consent of the classes was meaningless unless, in addition, the
judge found the plan to be "fair and equitable, and feasible."
C. Soliciting Acceptance of the Plan-The Disclosure Statement
and Pre-Petition Acceptances
A primary concern of the judge will be the disclosure provi-
sions of sections 1125 and 1126. Pursuant to section 1125, the
judge determines, prior to post-petition solicitation, whether the
holders of claims and interests will have received adequate infor-
mation before they accept or reject. Under section 1126(b), the
judge must determine whether pre-petition acceptances can be
counted. Since acceptance of the plan by the class is largely deter-
minative, the vote must be made on meaningful data.
For a post-petition solicitation, each member of the class must
receive "adequate information" before the vote which conforms to
section 1125(a)(1) which reads:
"[A]dequate information" means information of a kind, and in
sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable in light of
135. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (Supp. III 1979). For a description of the term "statutory
majority," see infra text accompanying notes 146-48.
136. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8)(B) (Supp. III 1979).
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the nature and history of the debtor and the condition of the
debtor's books and records, that would enable a hypothetical
reasonable investor typical of holders of claims or interest of
the relevant class to make an informed judgment about the
plan.
The material, however, need not include any information about
any other proposed plans.
In section 1125 (a)(), chapter 11 recognizes the facts of life in a
distress situation. The debtor's books may be almost unintel-
ligible during a period of turmoil preceding a filing. The services
of an outside accountant may have been discontinued for lack of
money to pay him, or for less creditable reasons. A debtor in
trouble may take liberties with accounting rules and prefer to
avoid the "interference" of outside accountants.137 Often neither
time nor money is available for a full audit of the financial
records; the plan proponent must manage with the available
information.13
8
When acceptances or rejections are solicited prior to com-
mencement of the case, under section 1126(b), the judge must be
satisfied that some applicable nonbankruptcy law on disclosure
was followed 39 or, if no such law is applicable, that there was
adequate disclosure under the standards of section 1125(a)(1).
One weakness of chapter XI was that it did not have a provision
analogous to the disclosure requirements of chapter 11. When
chapter XI was enacted in 1938, the full effect of the Securities Act
of 1933 and its progeny had not yet been felt. The philosophy of
these acts focuses on the adequacy of the information given to the
investors, buyers, sellers, or other decisionmakers, thereby en-
abling the prospective investor, buyer, seller, or other person be-
ing solicited to decide for himself whether to buy, sell, accept, or
reject the proposal at issue. Chapter 11, almost a half century
later, adopts that philosophy.
D. Sections 1125 and 1126-Determining Acceptances and
Rejections
For purposes of section 1129(a), holders of claims vote by
137. An entrepreneur who for years has bought control of business entities in financial
distress once remarked to me that he had never found the financial records not to overstate
assets and understate liabilities. Often a switch from one permitted accounting practice to
another may produce a misleading financial picture.
138. See generally S. RaE. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5787.
139. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1976).
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classes. 140 Section 1126 defines when a class has accepted or re-
jected the plan.14 1 Section 1126(b) governs pre-petition accept-
ances and rejections. Such votes may be counted when: (1) the
solicitation material is made in accordance with applicable
nonbankruptcy law, such as the proxy rules of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934; 142 or (2) in the absence of such law, the judge
finds that information given before the vote is adequate under sec-
tion 1125(a)(1). 143 While nothing in section 1126 relates to solici-
tations during the proceedings, section 1125(b) forbids post-
petition solicitation except after receipt by the voters of materials
which give "adequate information." 1" Section 1125(b) is one of
the comparatively few provisions which direct the judge to exer-
cise preconfirmation supervision over certain aspects of every
chapter 11 case. The plan proponent's failure to comply with sec-
tions 1125 and 1126 may prevent a confirmation under section
1129(a)(8).145
The Terms Statutory Majority and Statutory Minority
These terms are not used in the Bankruptcy Code, but by using
them, we may avoid bothersome repetition of provisions of section
1126 and, to a lesser extent, section 1124. The following is a
description rather than a definition.
Start with section 1126(c). In the rough, the "majority" con-
sists of holders of two-thirds in amount and more than half in
number of a class of claims. Subsection (c) goes on to make three
important qualifications: (1) the calculation is made as to those
140. 11 U.S.C. § 1124(3) (Supp. III 1979) treats the claim as unimpaired if the amount
of the creditor's claim which is allowed is paid in cash and the creditor is thereby "cashed
out." An unimpaired class of creditors need not be solicited, but § 1126 is ambiguous as to
whether that class can vote against a plan filed in chapter 11; § 1126(f) provides that it is
"deemed to have accepted the plan." Section 1126(a) leans the other way. The preliminary
draft of the new Bankruptcy Rules number 3018 seems to say that any creditor with an
allowed claim can vote. See In re Barrington Oaks Gen. Partnership, 15 Bankr. 952 (D.
Utah 1981), for a statement of the cases.
141. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a)-(g) (Supp. III 1979). Subsection (a) states that each "holder of
a claim or interest allowed under section 502 . . . may accept or reject the plan." See
supra note 140.
142. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1976).
143. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1976).
144. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (Supp. III 1979). Failure to comply with §§ 1125 and 1126
could interfere with meeting the requirements of § 1129(a)(l)-(3) and thereby prevent
confirmation.
145. See id. § 1129(a)(1), (2). Furthermore, all of the provisions of § 1129(a), including
those of (a)(10) and (11), must be met for confirmation under § 1129(a) or (b), except that
resort to (b) excuses compliance with (a)(8) only.
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who accept or reject; (2) under subsection (e), on request of a
party in interest, the judge may exclude an entity which he finds
has not acted or was not solicited in good faith; and (3) on one
reading of section 1126(f) and 1129(2)(8)(B), a class may be ex-
cluded from voting. The class is "deemed to have accepted" by
subsection (f) of section 1126 because section 1124 states that it is
unimpaired. But suppose a class which the statute says is
unimpaired thinks that it is in fact impaired and affirmatively re-
jects the plan? Some well-reasoned cases interpret "deemed" to
mean "presumed" to have accepted, and that presumption is over-
ridden by an actual rejection. Section 1126(f) does not require
solicitation of an unimpaired class, but it does not prohibit solici-
tation. If members of the class receive no ballot, Form 30 in the
proposed new Bankruptcy Rules provides one. Again, the prob-
lem and the cases and commentaries are well discussed by Bank-
ruptcy Judge Mabey in In re Barrington Oaks General
Partnershp.146
In contrast to the "deemed acceptance" of section 1126(f), a
class that gets nothing is conclusively deemed to have rejected the
plan under subsection (g)'s provisions. It seems unlikely that a
class which gets nothing will object to being counted as having
rejected, but a class of stockholders might prefer to accept be-
cause, for example, the plan gives members of the class something
desirable on their subordinated debentures. 47
Subsection (d) is to classes of interests what subsection (c) is to
creditors, except that there is no "half in number" requirement. A
majority of a class determined under these qualifications is what
we will call the statutory majority.
Conversely, a statutory minority is any combination of holders
of claims or interests which will prevent the plan proponent from
obtaining a statutory majority of the class. A statutory minority
can be the holders of just over one-third in amount of the class'
claims or interests; or one-half of the holders of a class of claims,
plus one.
A class can be comprised of a single holder of a claim or inter-
est, if his claim or interest is distinguishable from others. This one
holder might prevent a plan from being confirmed under section
1129(a)(8) (unless disqualified on good faith grounds or disen-
146. 15 Bankr. 952 (D. Utah 1981). See also In re Marston Enterprises, 13 Bankr. 514
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) for a good discussion.
147. Some holders of claims may be excluded under this formulation. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1126(e)-(g) (Supp. III 1979). See text accompanying infra notes 148-49.
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franchised under section 1124, if that is possible); the minority of
one class can prevent the proponent from obtaining the required
statutory majority of each class. To repeat, both the statutory ma-
jority and the statutory minority are determined from those enti-
tled to, and who in fact did, vote. We have raised questions
concerning two exceptions: a class that gets nothing is deemed to
have rejected the plan-section 1126(g); and a class that is
unimpaired is deemed under subsection (f) to have accepted.
The concept of what constitutes acceptance or rejection by a
class of interests is important primarily with respect to a confirma-
tion under section 1129(a)(8) or 1129(b). A class acceptance
means little unless each other class somehow is also bound-by
the statutory majority under section 1129(a), by exclusion from
voting under section 1124 or 1126, or by certain judicial findings
under section 1129(b). If a plan proponent fails to obtain confir-
mation under section 1129(a)(8) because he fails to obtain consent
of a class, before he considers a cramdown of that class under
section 1129(b), he may look for help under section 1124. 148 De-
pending on which line of cases predominates, the combination of
sections 1126(f) and 1124 may or may not be important in ob-
taining confirmation of a plan by removing the power of a non-
consenting class to reject. 149 Under section 1124, a class may be
held to have been unimpaired; under section 1126(f) an
unimpaired class is "deemed to have accepted a plan," and the
class need not be solicited. Section 1129(a)(8)(B) does not require
the class' acceptance. A small number of cases, but the weight of
what authority there is at this early date, rejects this reasoning if
the class actually has rejected.
Before we turn to section 1124, we may contrast sections
1126(f) and (g). Under subsection (f), an unimpaired class is
deemed to have accepted, and it need not be solicited. Contrari-
wise, under section 1126(g), classes which receive no compensa-
tion under the plan are deemed to have rejected the plan. Unlike
subsection (f), subsection (g) contains no indication that these
classes need not be solicited. The automatic rejection by a class
which gets no compensation under the plan, even though it has no
equity, may prevent confirmation under section 1129(a)(8); under
section 1129(a)(8)(B), acceptances need not include a class which
is unimpaired as to the "deemed to have rejected" class since there
148. See supra notes 123 & 140 and accompanying text.
149. See infra note 152 and supra notes 123 & 140 and accompanying text.
Vol. 32:301
B.ANK RUPTCY CODE
is no counterpart of section 1129(a)(8)(B). If the class has no eq-
uity, however, giving it nothing is giving it what it-is worth, and
confirmation under section 1129(b) may be possible. 50 .
Under old chapter X and section 77, a plan proponent was not
required to solicit a class of holders of claims or interests whose
members would not participate in the new corporate entity. There
is no similar provision in chapter 11. Subsection (g), unlike sub-
section (f), does not excuse solicitation of the no-equity class with
which subsection (g) deals. Section 1126(g) seems to recognize the
right of such a class to be eliminated only after the plan proponent
goes through the exercise prescribed under section 1129(b).' 5 ' If,
however, a prior class had been more than compensated by the
stream of earnings, the rejected class might be able to prove that
there was something left for it. A hearing on an earnings valua-
tion could be tedious and expensive in a contested case. Proving
that the class should get nothing would involve earnings estimates,
determination of a suitable times-earnings multiple and all that
goes with a fair and equitable valuation under section 1129(b).
To summarize, since confirmation under section 1129(a)(8) re-
quires acceptance by every impaired class, automatic rejection of
a class under section 1126(g), even one impaired to the point that
it has no equity, can prevent confirmation under subsection (a) of
section 1129. Confirmation under subsection (b) may be possible;
after proof under section 1129(b)(2)(B) or (C) that its claim is
worth zero, the class gets zero. Any class junior to that class would
likewise be excluded.
Classes which retain a participation in the plan may find it
more profitable to give some interest to the classes with no appar-
ent present equity interest, thereby obtaining consent of the class.
With that consent, confirmation under section 1129(a)(8) can be
150. See infra notes 186-206 and accompanying text.
151. If, for example, stockholders are also holders of a class of prior claims, they might
be influenced to vote for a plan which gives them nothing on their stock, but something
acceptable on the prior claims. The language in § 1126(g) seems to give no weight to the
consent of persons in this position. This section provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a class is deemed not to have
accepted a plan if such plan provides that the claims or interests of such class do
not entitle the holders of such claims or interests to any payment or compensation
under the plan on account of such claims or interests.
11 U.S.C. § 1126(g) (Supp. III 1979). Does "deemed to have accepted" mean more than
presumed to have accepted in the absence of contrary action? See S.REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 122, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5709-10, stating
that rejection under § 1126(g) is conclusive. No similar remarks are made as to § 1126(0.
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obtained, thus avoiding the problems associated with a section
1129(b) cramdown.
E. Section 1124-Depriving a Class of a Right to Reject
1. Can a Plan Proponent Effectively Prevent a Class from
Rejecting a Plan by Fitting that Class Into One of the
Subsections of Section 1124?
We must develop more fully several concepts introduced ear-
lier. Assume that the debtor is having difficulty in persuading one
class to accept the plan and that this failure is preventing him
from having a confirmation under the relatively easy standards of
section 1129(a)(8). While subsection (A) requires that a majority
of each class accept the plan, subsection (B) excepts a class that is
unimpaired. Subsections (1), (2), and (3) of section 1124 state that
certain classes are unimpaired. Under subsection (f) of section
1126, an unimpaired class is deemed to have accepted. To ask the
question more accurately: Can a plan proponent prevent a class
from rejecting by fitting that class into subsection (1), (2), or (3) of
section 1124? The answer to this question is not simple. We start
with section 1126(f). That section begins:
notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a class that
is not impaired under a plan is deemed to have accepted the
plan, and solicitation of acceptances with respect to such class
from the holders of claims or interest[s] of such class is not
required.
There has been no other default under the indenture but the
filing of the petition was a default. The market price of a class of
bonds which section 1124(1) treats as unimpaired has dropped
precipitiously on announcement of the reorganization. The class
unanimously rejects the plan, arguing that it is entitled to better
treatment under the plan or, at worst, that as a rejecting class, it is
entitled to the economic protection afforded by section
1129(b)(2)(A).
A class of two banks indicates that the class will also reject the
plan. One installment of interest has been unpaid-beyond the
grace period-a clear default under the loan agreement. Sugges-
tions by the class as to an acceptable plan are rejected. The debtor
scrapes up enough cash to pay the overdue interest installment,
with interest on interest, six months after the grace period has ex-
pired. Under section 1124(2), the class is now unimpaired. The
bank class also believes that it should be better treated under the
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plan and would be treated better under sections
1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II) as a rejecting class.
The class members announce their intention to send in ballots
marked "reject." Counsel for each class points to the first sentence
in section 1126(a):
(a) The holder of a claim or interest allowed under section 502
of this title may accept or reject a plan.
Counsel argues that the "deemed to have accepted" provision is
overridden by an actual rejection. Counsel also cites the prelimi-
nary draft of Rule 3018 of the Bankruptcy Rules, published for
discussion in March 1982, which seems to be more influenced by
that first sentence of section 1126(a) than by the special language
of subsection (f). Subsection 1129(a)(8) reads:
With respect to each class
(A) Such class has accepted the plan; or
(B) Such class is not impaired under the plan.
The pertinent language of section 1124 reads:
... a class of claims or interests is impaired under a plan
unless, with respect to each claim or interest of such class,
the plan-
(1) leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual
rights to which such claim or interest entitles the holder
of such claim or interest . . . .
The debtor contends that the bondholders fit within this provision.
The banks come within subsection (2):
notwithstanding any contractual provisions or applicable law
that entitles the holder of such claim or interest to demand or
receive accelerated payment of such claim or interest after the
occurrence of a default-
(A) cures any such default other than a default of a kind
specified in section 365(b)(2) of this title, that occurred
before or after the commencement of the case under
this title; [Section (A) would excuse the petition filing.](B) reinstates the maturity of such claim or interest as such
maturity existed before such default; [Section (B) would
permit cure of the interest default.]
(C) compensates the holder of such claim or interest for any
damages incurred as a result of any reasonable reliance
by such holder of such contractual provisions of such
applicable law; and [The debtor contends that interest
on interest satisifes (C).]
(D) does not otherwise alter the legal, equitable, or contrac-
tual rights to which such claim or interest entitles the
holder of such claim or interest. . ..
The banks argue that they are impaired economically and le-
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gally in not being able to call in a low interest debt and currently
reinvest at twice the old rate. The bondholders maintain that a
default giving them the same right to accelerate is only a matter of
time and that the legal injury occurred six months earlier. Each
class argues that it is in fact impaired economically; in fact, each
has rejected the plan, thus contradicting the "deemed to have ac-
cepted" language of section 1126(f.
This analysis might well be followed by an examination of
subsection (3) of 1124, but since that section has no appeal to the
debtor on the facts here, we will discuss first the concepts of im-
pairment and acceptance mentioned above. Very roughly, a claim
is "impaired" under the code in the manner in which it would be
"materially and adversely affected" under the act, but the tests are
not exactly the same. Nevertheless, subsection (1) carries forward a
traditional principle: If the class in fact is not materially affected
(impaired under the code) tradition has it that the class need not
be consulted as to a reorganization plan. Between them sections
1124(2)(A) and 365(a)(2) excuse the petiton filing as a default.
Thus, a class of first lien bonds, as to which no default has oc-
curred, are to be left "undisturbed" under the plan. The class
under a combination of sections 1124(1) and 1126(f) need not be
solicited and is deemed to have accepted. The drop in market
price of the bonds proves that the mere filing caused an economic
impairment. Though neither class is solicited, members of each
write up ballots in the form the Bankruptcy Rules prescribe and
reject the plan.
Subsection (2) assumes the occurrence of a default which can
either be disregarded or cured, depending on the type of default.
Congress apparently is saying two things: 2 if the default is one
which might be considered "technical" in nature, the proponent
can act as though no such default has occurred. These defaults
include a failure to maintain some financial ratio or the act of
having filed the petition under this proceeding. This kind of a de-
fault is basically noncurable, and thus, section 1124 follows sec-
tion 365(b)(2) in excusing a cure. Congress also is saying, in
subsection (A), that the cure of a default may be made presuma-
bly without regard to the time limits imposed by the contract be-
tween the debtor and the creditors if subsections (2)(B), (C), and
(D) are satisfied. That cure would have to be accompanied by the
152. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 401-32, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & Ad News 5963, 6357-87.
[Vol. 32:301
B.NKRUPTCY CODE
payment of any actual damages suffered by the creditor. Section
1124(2) differs from section 365 in that 365 requires assurance of
future ability to perform as a condition to pretending that no de-
fault has occurred. 53 Can the banks successfully argue that they
are damaged to the extent of the difference between continuing
ten percent on the old debt and twenty percent currently obtaina-
ble? The statute's idea that no impairment has taken place may
not be shared by the class whose contract was not fulfilled. The
default on the bank loans which will be cured on confirmation
was the result of the failure to pay the last installment on the bank
loan; that payment has now been made with interest on interest as
"damages."
Assuming that no legal injury has taken place, section 1124(2)
says that the class rights will no longer be impaired. The bank
takes quite a different attitude. The failure of the debtor to have
made a payment, the maturity date of which had been agreed to
long ago, indicates to the credit analyst that the credit has deterio-
rated seriously. Nevertheless, the plan reinstates the original ma-
turity, and the debtor is treated as though no such default had
occurred. The bank argues strenuously that the ten percent fixed
interest rate on this term loan which has been outstanding for
some years is seriously out of line with the twenty percent rate
which it could obtain in the 1982 market. Mere reinstatement of
the old maturity and payment of back interest does not satisfy sec-
tion 1124(C); creditors relied on the ability to call the loan on
filing of a petition. The bank also argues that even if the interest
rate is adjusted upwards to meet 1982 standards, it is impaired
legally by being forced to continue a credit which does not meet
the standards agreed to in the original loan agreement. Notwith-
standing the language of sections 1124(2) and 1126(f), the bank
rejected the plan.
Can the debtor take the position that a judge must disregard
the actual rejection by the bank and count the bank class as hav-
ing accepted the plan because section 1126(f) deems that accept-
ance to have taken place? The early commentators on this section
seem to have assumed that these two sections mean what they may
appear to say. When actual cases came before the courts, the an-
swer was not that easy. In In re Marston Enterprises, Inc. ,14 the
court looked to the fact of rejection and not to the "deemed ac-
153. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(A), (B), and (C) (Supp. III 1979).
154. 13 Bankr. 514 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
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ceptance" of section 1126(f). The court read "deemed" to mean
basically the same as "presumed." A presumption can be rebutted
by the actual facts. The cases and the literature are reviewed in In
re Barrington Oaks General Partnership. Barrington follows
Marston.
What difference does it make how the question is resolved?
Assume that the creditors are the bondholders, the banks, and un-
secured creditors with insignificant claims. If the plan can be
deemed to have been accepted by the bondholders and the banks,
all other classes (i.e., one unsecured creditor class with insignficant
aggregate claims in comparison with those of the holder of bonds
and bank debt) having accepted through a statutory majority, the
plan can be confirmed under section 1129(a)(8). If the vote of the
bondholders or the banks is considered as a rejection, the rejecting
class can be forced to take what the plan provides only if that plan
satisfies the legal and economic standards of section
1129(b)(2)(A)(i) or (ii) or (iii). The banks and the bondholders are
satisfied that their rights will be protected better if the debtor re-
sorts to a cramdown under subsection (b)(2). The situation might
be a bit ironic in light of one interpretation of sections 1126(f) and
1129(a)(10). Suppose there is no actual class to accept (insiders are
not counted under section 1129(a)(10)). If the deemed acceptance
controls over an actual rejection, a plan might be confirmed be-
cause the rejecting class is deemed to have accepted.
An answer to a question above-whether the debtor can use
sections 1124 and 1126(f) to take away from a creditor class the
right to reject- would arise again with respect to action which
might or might not satisfy section 1129(a)(10). That section re-
quires that no plan can be confirmed by the judge unless it has
been accepted by at least one class. There is some ambiguity:
must that one class be an impaired class which has given an actual
acceptance, or can it be a class which section 1124 says is not im-
paired? Again, the later cases require an actual acceptance.
15 6
2. A Cash-Out Under Section 1124(3), Without and With
Section 1111(b) Complications
We have not discussed the third subsection of section 1124. It
is possible that the debtor who desires to put through a plan
against the wishes of a particular class might be able to "cash out"
155. 15 Bankr. 952 (D. Utah 1981).
156. See, e.g. Marston Enterprises; Barrington Oaks.
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the class by a cash payment at confirmation of the full amount of
the claim or interest. A payment in cash is what the bondholders
and the banks would have liked, but the debtor would find it most
unattractive in the case described above.
This subsection (3), and the related section 1111, may be diffi-
cult to understand without regard to what secured creditors con-
sidered an undesirable result under the famous case of In re Pine
Gate Associates, Ltd 157 A bankruptcy court held that under the
prior section 461(11) of chapter XII, a nonassenting creditor could
be "cashed out," not at the amount of the debt, but at its value. In
this case, since the claim was one in which the individual partner
debtors were not liable personally, the court held that the value of
the debt was no more than the value of the collateral. Unfortu-
nately, the value of the apartment complex had deteriorated
greatly since the time that the mortgage loan was made. Putting
aside the questions as to how that value was determined, we can
say that under the cramdown power of the court under section
461(11) of chapter XII, the partnership debtor was able to refi-
nance the mortgage debt in a smaller amount from a different
lender and to discharge the old mortgage debt by the payment of,
something considerably less than the amount of the old debt. The
partners, with a nominal investment, now owned the property
subject to a smaller mortgage; they awaited a normal real estate
market while the partially paid lender licked his wounds. This
case aroused the interest and ire of secured creditors who argued
that the secured creditor should have been allowed either to take
over the property and take his chances that at some point the
property would again be worth something close to the amount of
the loan, or he should be paid now the amount of the loan rather
than its "value" (limited to the value of the collateral) as part of
the plan.' 58  To prevent a repetition of Pine Gate, creditors
presented a draft of section 111 (b), a section new to the law.
157. 10 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 581 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
158. The result in Pine Gate was provided by two factors: First, the creditors, for rea-
sons of their own, had agreed to look for repayment of their loans only to the value of the
collateral. They thought that they knew enough about the intrinsic value of the project to
feel confident that if the project ran into temporary financial difficulties, they could fore-
close their mortgage, and if the outside bids were unsatisfactory, they could bid on the
property and hold it for the expected return to its real value. Second, the language of
§ 461(11) of chapter XII was overlooked. This language invited the court to reach the
conclusion that if the debtor could pay in cash the then depressed value of the collateral;
the debtor, and not the creditors, could await its return to its hoped-for intrinsic value. See
Anderson & Ziegler, Real Property Arrangements Under the Old and New Bankruptcy Acts,
25 Loy. L. REv. 713, 730-34, 739-42 (1979); Note, From Debtor's Shield to Creditor's
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Subsection (3) of section 1124 must be read in the light of sec-
tions 1111(b)(1) and (2). First, look to the language of 1124(3)
which provides:
[A class is not impaired if the plan]
(3) provides that, on the effective date of the plan, the
holder of such claim or interest receives, on account of
such claim or interest, cash equal to (A) with respect to
a claim, the allowed amount of such claim ....
Section 1111(b) is an attempt to avoid the Pine Gate result
under either of two subsections.159 Section 111 l(b)(1) would have
allowed the Pine Gate creditor to have asserted a deficiency claim
equal to the difference between the value of his collateral and the
amount of the debt, in spite of the fact that the contract had pro-
vided otherwise. In other words, section 111 l(b)(1) creates a defi-
ciency claim-a recourse claim against the debtor-where none
existed before. 60 The debtor owes a secured debt measured by the
value of the collateral 61 and by operation of section 111 l(b)(1), he
now owes an unsecured debt for the excess.
162
An illustration may help explain these difficult concepts.
Debtor has purchased, under a purchase money security interest, a
printing press on which he has made a considerable number of
payments. Due to improvements in the art, and wear and tear on
the machine, the printing press is not presently worth the amount
of the unpaid debt. Under section 506, the bankruptcy judge, at an
earlier stage, had ruled that the printing press was worth no more
than one-half of the debt balance amount. That finding is not dis-
Sword- Cram Down Under the Chandler Act and the Bankrutcy Reform Act, 55 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 713, 726-34 (1979).
159. See generally 1 BANKR. SERV. LAW. ED. § 6:134 (1979); Kaplan, Nonrecourse Un-
secured Creditors Under New Chapter 11-The Section 1111(b) Election: Already a Needfor
Change, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 269 (1979).
160. Treating A's nonrecourse claim as though it were a full recourse claim could in-
crease the total claims to the point where distribution to unsecured creditors could be a
problem. An unsecured creditor might have extended credit on the assumption that as to
non-mortgaged assets he would not be competing with an unsecured claim of the partially
secured creditor.
161. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Supp. III 1979).
162. Id. § 111l(b)(1)(A)(ii). In the real estate construction financing typified by Pine
Gate, there are likely to be few unsecured creditors, and their claims are likely to be nomi-
nal in amount. The existence of this new deficiency claim may allow the secured creditor
(in its capacity as an unsecured creditor) to control the unsecured creditor class. In the
unsecured creditor class, the secured creditor can sometimes prevent the debtor's plan from
being confirmed, even if the debtor could "cram down" the secured creditor as such under
§ 1129(b)(2); under (B)(ii) classes below the unpaid unsecured creditor are eliminated.
Without regard to the value of the unsecured claims the full amount must be paid before
juniors can take anything.
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puted. The creditor, therefore, has a secured claim for one-half of
the debt and an unsecured claim for one-half of the debt. The
debtor's business could not survive the secured party's reposses-
sion of the printing press. The debtor is prepared to remove that
threat by paying the secured debt. Unlike the real estate project in
Pine Gate, the debtor has a substantial unsecured creditor class.
The debtor hopes that the deficiency will be swallowed up by a
large group of unsecured creditors willing to accept the plan. If
only subsection (1) of section 111 (b) is applicable, the debtor can
keep the printing press if he pays the amount of the secured por-
tion under section 1124(3). The existence of the unsecured defi-
ciency claim will not expose him to the possible loss of the needed
printing press.
Subsection (b)(2) of section 1111 is more complicated. 163 We
put aside the exceptions. If two-thirds of the secured class so
elects, the class may convert its combination of the unsecured por-
tion and the secured portion of the debt into a secured claim for
the total. The class thereby gives up its unsecured claim and any
strategic value it may have is lost.
Now the situation changes. If the plan proponent attempts a
cash-out, both the immediate cash cost to the debtor and the cash
return to the secured class at confirmation increase. By exercising
the magic power of section 111l(b)(2), the secured creditor con-
verts the entire claim into a secured claim. In the process, the
debtor loses his chance to keep the press by paying only its present
value. If the section 1124(3) cash-out is not thwarted by the in-
crease in its cash cost to the debtor, the secured party wins his
1 ll(b)(2) bet. In the absence of a section 1124(3) cash-out by the
debtor, this class election eventually may prove unwise from the
secured creditor's viewpoint. The appreciation which the secured
creditors hoped for in Pine Gate is unlikely to occur in the value of
the printing press. The secured party class has lost its unsecured
claim and its strategic value in a section 1129(b)(2)(B) cramdown.
The other situation where section 1111 might change the result
is a cramdown under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II). Should a
cramdown of the secured party occur under that section, the
amount of the secured claim goes up, but that is no guarantee of
any increase in value which would make that increase meaningful.
163. Id. § 111 (b)(2). This subsection provides: "If such an election is made, then
notwithstanding section 506(a) of this title, such claim is a secured claim to the extent that
such claim is allowed." Id.
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It is possible that even where the plan provides that the credi-
tor will receive a cash payment on the date of confirmation, he
still might have reasons to reject the plan if he is paid only the
value of the collateral. But if the partially secured creditor is paid
in full under subsection (3) of 1124 rather than treated under (1)
or (2), the problem discussed above of rejection versus "deemed to
accept" would seem to evaporate.
Eliminating a class by a cash payment in the full amount of
the debt, particularly where the class elects to treat the entire debt
as though it were secured fully when it is not, often will not be
attractive to the plan proponent. Such a procedure may be attrac-
tive where a piece of collateral has a particularly high value to the
debtor, and the amount of cash required is not prohibitive. The
creditors committee, representing the unsecured creditors, may be
willing to see the debtor part with scarce cash equal to the value of
the collateral, but not in the full amount of one creditor's claim,
when half in reality is unsecured. Counsel for the committee rec-
ommends that the present cash drain required under section
1124(3) be avoided through a long-term pay-out under section
1129(b)(2)(A). The section 111l(b)(2) election is now a gamble.
The new Bankruptcy Rules, not yet final, will determine the time
after which the creditor class cannot reverse its choice.
F. Section 1129(a)(7)-The "Best Interest of Creditors" Test
A basic test of chapter XI, that the plan of arrangement be in
the "best interest of creditors," is continued in section
1129(a)(7). 164 In that section, unlike some other subsections of
section 1129(a), the test is applied not to classes, but to each mem-
ber of a class. 165 Any member of a class, therefore, can complain
that he is getting less under the plan than under a chapter 7 liqui-
dation. If a class member convinces the judge of this deprivation,
no confirmation is possible. If, however, a partially secured class
elects, under section 111 (b)(2), to relinquish its unsecured claim
with the hope that the collateral will be enough to liquidate the
claim, the class member cannot complain that under the plan he
gets nothing on his unsecured claim whereas he would have re-
ceived something in a liquidation proceeding. That member's
164. See infra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
165. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 1(366(2)), 52 Stat. 840, 911. See S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. News 5787.
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class has made its own bed. This principle is contained within
section 1129(a)(7)(B) which states:
[flf section 1111(b)(2) of this title... applies to the claims of
such class, each holder of a claim of such class will receive or
retain under the plan on account of such claim property of a
value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less than
the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in the
property that secures such claims.' 66
G. Section 1129(a)(9)-Priority Claims
Section 1129(a)(9) refers to claims accorded priority by section
507. Any priority claim holder can agree to take less than the
statute gives him. With some types of priority debt, the class ma-
jority of claim holders can agree on behalf of the entire class to
take less than the statute allows. Thus, certain priority claim
holders will be required by a class vote to accept less under section
1129(a)(9)(B)(i), thereby losing some of their full rights. Only in-
dividual holders of certain other priority claims can waive their
rights to cash payments.167
Certain priorities, including claims related to administrative
expenses and claims resulting from the failure of "adequate pro-
tection" under sections 362, 363 or 364 to have been in fact ade-
quate, must be paid in cash unless the particular holder agrees
otherwise. A plan, therefore, might be defeated by the debtor's
inability to pay a substantial administrative claim in cash, includ-
ing the repayment loans made under section 364(a) to persuade
each holder to accept something else. A holder who wishes to see
the plan confirmed may, only at his election, accept other compen-
sation such as deferred cash payments.
Certain cash payments for nongovernmental claims may be
waived by a class.' 68 These claims include those given priority for
wages, 169 contributions to employee benefit plans, 70  or certain
166. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(B)(i) (Supp. III 1979). Section 1129(a) contains a number
of provisions which do not merit full discussion here. Presumably any member of a class
can object to a plan that does not conform to subsection 1129(a)(1) or (2) (general compli-
ance with the code); subsection (3) (good faith); information as to subsections (4) (certain
payments), (5) (affiliations of insiders), or (6) (regulatory commission approval); as well as
to subsections (7) (previously discussed); (9) (certain priorities not governed by class ac-
tion); (10) (acceptance by at least one class); or (11) (feasibility). Subsection (8), however,
is different; it applies to the class rather than the individual members of the class (the
majority binds the minority).
167. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(B).
168. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(B)(i).
169. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(B)(i), (ii).
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customer deposits.171 In these circumstances, an individual claim
holder must accept the decision of the class, even though as a class
member, his claim would receive a section 507 priority.
Under section 1129(a)(9)(C), 7 2 certain claims by governmen-
tal entities may be deferred without the consent of the holder or of
the class for a maximum of six years. This provision does not
resolve the question of whether regular installments must be paid
during the six-year period. Since Congress postponed action on
certain tax aspects of reorganization in 1978 and covered some tax
issues not found in the Bankruptcy Code in 1980, plan proponents
will be well-advised to check the current status of the bankruptcy
tax legislation.
H. Section 1129(a)(1 0)-The Plan Must Be Accepted by at
Least One Class of Claims, Determined Without
Including an Insider of Such Class
If a debtor has only one class of creditors, he cannot have a
plan confirmed without acceptance by that class. In contrast, sec-
tion 1129(a)(10) is satisfied automatically by an acceptance of a
plan by each impaired class under section 1129(a)(8). Prior to a
cramdown of a class under section 1129(b), however, at least one
other class must have accepted to the plan 173 without including
any acceptance by each impaired insider within the class. 174 Had
Senate Bill 689 of the 96th Congress passed, it would have re-
quired actual acceptance by an impaired class, rather than a
deemed acceptance, in accordance with the provisions of sections
1124 and 1126(f). We have treated this problem in connection
with sections 1124 and 1126(f) and need not repeat. 175
170. Id. § 507(a)(3).
171. Id. § 507(a)(4).
172. Id. § 507(a)(5).
173. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(C). Section 507(a)(6) lists a number of unsecured government
claims given priority. These include income, property, employment, and excise tax, cus-
toms duty or an associated penalty owed or uncollected at the time the petition is filed.
174. Id. § 1129(a)(10). In determining whether the statutory majority of each impaired
class will consent to a plan under § 1129(a)(8), it is interesting to note the standards which
the majority class applies. Essentially, each class consents when the plan seems reasonable
to the particular class. The motives of each class may well differ, as may the reason for
giving consent.
175. See infra notes 123-26, 146, 152-54 and accompanying text.
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I. Section 1129(a)(11) -Yhe Plan Must Provide More than
Temporary Relief-It Must be Feasible
The text of section 1129(a)(11) is self- explanatory. The sec-
tion states that the court should confirm the plan only if
"[c]onfirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liq-
uidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the
debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless such
liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan." 
176
It is possible that each class would consent to a plan which left
the debtor with such a debt- heavy capital structure, and necessar-
ily with an inadequate equity capital, that the judge or one of the
parties might call into play section 1129(a)(l 1). Furthermore, if a
cramdown satisfying the secured debt requirements of section
1129(b)(2)(A) were to leave the reorganized company with an
overload of debt, section 1129(a)(11) could prevent a court from
confirming the plan. 177
J. Section 1129(a)(8)-When Each Impaired Class Accepts
Subsection (a)(8) may be the most important subsection of sec-
tion 1129. If the parties have complied with the other provisions
of section 1129(a) and the consent of each impaired class is ob-
tained, the judge must confirm the plan. Some other subsections
of section 1129(a) prescribe the procedure to be followed, while
still other provisions contain the actual requirements for a confir-
mation. Under section 1129(a)(8), the parties, acting through a
statutory majority of each class, may accept the plan. A statutory
majority or minority may cause the plan to fail confirmation by
making it impossible for the plan proponent to obtain a statutory
majority. An individual member of a class might prevent confir-
mation by persuading the judge that some requirement of section
(a) has not been met.
Section 1129(a)(8) partially rejects the teaching of Case v. Los
Angeles Lumber Products, Ltd.,171 a section 77B case which re-
quired the judge to make findings before the class approvals could
become effective. The judge was required to find that the plan
was "fair and equitable, and feasible." The incorporation of the
176. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (Supp. III 1979).
177. See, e.g.,In re Landmark at Park Plaza, Ltd., 7 Bankr. 653 (D. N.J. 1980) (confir-
mation denied under § 1129(a)(111); the court anticipated liquidation or further financial
reorganization likely). Cf. In re Hollanger and Hollanger, 15 Bankr. 35 (D. La. 1981) (plan
confirmed notwithstanding objections of some creditors).
178. 308 U.S. 106 (1939). See supra notes 57 & 118-21 and accompanying text.
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fair and equitable rule in various chapters in 1938, its repeal as to
some proceedings in 1953, and its retention as to different pro-
ceedings under the act are beyond the scope of this Article. Suf-
fice it to say that immediately prior to the adoption of chapter 11,
the rule applied to a proceeding under section 77 and chapter X,
but not to one under Chapter XI. Chapter 11 makes it possible to
effect confirmation of a plan without the "fair and equitable" find-
ing if section 1129(a), including 1129(a)(8), is satisfied. Prior to
the effective date of chapter 11, that plan, under chapter X or sec-
tion 77 of the old act, could have been confirmed only if that find-
ing had been made. Section 1129(a)(8), therefore, is one of the
significant sections of the new Bankruptcy Code.
Chapter 11, like one of its predecessors, chapter XI, allows and
almost compels the parties to negotiate with each other. While
chapter X turned over the reorganization problem to outside ex-
perts-the trustee, the judge, and the SEC- chapter 11, like chap-
ter XI, leaves the problem in the hands of those financially
interested-the debtor, the creditors, the equity holders, and their
committees. The parties call on the judge only when they cannot
reach agreement among themselves. Unless called on by a party
in interest, the judge's role may not be too great. The judge's hard-
est problems arise where a plan proponent asks the judge to force
a class to take a plan it has rejected-a cramdown under section
1129(b). Reorganization is seldom primarily a product of the ju-
dicial process but, instead, as summarized by one of the writer's
mentors in corporate reorganization matters, arises from persuad-
ing many persons with diverse interests to think similarly at the
same time. The debtor or any of the parties may be the chief per-
suader. Persuasion includes peer pressure which may be found
within any class of more than one member. A converted creditor,
formerly a dissenter, may persuade another member of a dissent-
ing class to "go along" with the prosposed plan. Trade creditors
may persuade another class- say the banks-to consent, with or
without a modification of the plan. This converted class or mem-
ber of a class then often can influence the class peers more effec-
tively than could the debtor. The debtor may be convinced that a
modification of its plan is the price of acceptance.
In determining whether to consent to a plan, a class may con-
sider whether its claims are accorded the priority to which they
would have been entitled under chapter X's "fair and equitable"
(full priority) rule. Furthermore, in making this decision, a class
may request or demand from the debtor an estimate of the
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debtor's future earnings, or they may make their own estimate.
Neither the earnings estimate nor compliance or noncompliance
with the fair and equitable rule has any magic significance under
section 1129(a)(8), but either factor may aid wavering creditors in
deciding to accept or reject the plan. To paraphrase Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, the participants may make their decisions on in-
tuitions deeper than logic.79 Refined mathematical analysis may
convince a class that the corpse cannot be revived; it seldom will
convince a class as to when a reorganization can be affected. The
quality of future management is often the critical factor as to
death or survival of the entity. There are few statistical measures
of that quality. A few influential members of a class "feer' that
management can or cannot "make it," and acceptances follow.
A sense of timing, or the lack of it, may make or destroy a
plan. Two equally skillful counsel were casually discussing at
lunch stray problems of a debtor in possession. One was counsel
for the debtor, the other was counsel for the creditors' committee.
Counsel for the debtor: "Have you considered asking your com-
mittee to do [thus and so]?" Without hesitation, counsel for the
committee replied:
I have indeed given that a great deal of thought. This is not the
time to propose any action. The members of the committee are
now at that initial stage where they attribute all their problems
to misfeasance of the debtor. It will require a little time for
them to realize how much deeper the problem is. I think I can
make your suggestion in about two weeks.
As each resumed eating his sandwich, it was apparent that no
futher discussion was needed.
We assume now that the plan proponent cannot, or will not,
rely on sections 1124 or 1126(f) as removing the right of the dis-
senting class to reject by having that class treated as unimpaired
under section 1124(1), or more likely by a cure under section
1124(2) and less likely by a cash-out under section 1124(3). 180 The
179. The process of accepting or rejecting a plan could have been well-articulated in
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585 (1907). Justice Holmes stated
that "[t]he action does not appear to have been artibrary except in the sense in which many
honest and sensible judgments are so. They express in intuition of experience which out-
runs analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions; impressions which
may lie beneath consciousness without losing their worth." Id. at 598. In a recent Califor-
nia reorganization case, Judge Katz stated that in a highly charged case, scarcely a single
issue was settled on the basis of business judgment. In re Nite Lite Inns, 6 COLLIER
BANKR. CAs. 2d (MB) 107, 110 (1982).
180. 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (Supp. III 1979). This section states that claims or interests are
impaired unless the claim or interest is therein declared to be unimpaired under the plan.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [
plan proponent gives up hope of obtaining the acceptance of each
class that might have made a possible confirmation under section
1129(a)(8).
In sum, if the plan proponent cannot persuade the statutory
majority to consent, thereby failing to gain confirmation under
section 1129(a)(8), and cannot deprive .the nonassenting class of
the right to reject under section 1126, the plan proponent may not
yet abandon his plan. The plan proponent can consider amending
his plan so that class acceptances can be gained, and with it, con-
firmation under section 1129(a)(8). If no other alternative is feasi-
ble, the proponent also might consider resorting to a "cramdown"
under section 1129(b). Under that section, the plan proponent
might be able to cramdown the plan onto members of a class of
holders of claims or interests. This cramdown, however, may not
be an easy task.
An acceptance of a plan is much harder to obtain than a rejec-
tion. The statutory majority of each class is needed for a section
1129(a) confirmation. Confirmation under section 1129(b)(8) is
impossible if holders of one-third plus one dollar in amount of a
single class of claims or interests or holders of a half in number of
claims reject the plan. When the statutory minority of a single
class rejects the plan, and thus confirmation under section
1129(a)(8) cannot be had, the plan must be abandoned, or resort
to another provision is required. We have discussed section 1124
and section 1126(f), but some repitition and some additional con-
siderations may be necessary to an understanding of some difficult
concepts.
Subsection (B) of section 1129(a)(8) raises an interesting ques-
tion. To repeat the text:
(a) the court shall confirm if all of the following conditions are
met:
(A) Such class has accepted the plan; or
(B) such class is not impaired under the plan.
This subsection (B) must be read with sections 1124, as to when a
class is not impaired, 1126(f), which provides that a class not im-
paired is "deemed to have acepted the plan," and the first sentence
of 1126(a) which seems to give every holder a chance to accept or
reject. On one interpretation, a plan proponent can disenfranchise
a class by fitting it into subsections (1), (2) or (3) of 1124.
On what appears to be a literal reading of the statute, the plan
proponent might be able to get assistance from sections 1124,
1126(f) and 1129(a)(8)(B) by, in effect, disenfranchising the re-
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jecting class. If the proponent's purposes cannot be achieved
through section 1124, and if the proponent cannot change the
score by negotiating with those who have dissented, the plan pro-
ponent then would be faced with abandonment of the plan or the
perils of a section 1129(b) cramdown.
We have noted that a few early cases and a number of com-
mentators question this interpretation of these sections. The ques-
tion: did Congress, in section 1126(f), mean that if a class of
claims can be brought into a class which either section 1124(1),
(2), or (3) dictates is not impaired by the plan, the class is conclu-
sively "deemed to have accepted the plan," or does "deemed"
merely create a presumption that the class accepts this plan if it
does not actively reject? A recent case, In re Barrington Oaks Gen-
eral Partnershi ,181 reviews the literature on the controversy. That
case explores the legislative history and holds that it is illogical to
deem a class to have accepted when in fact it rejected the plan.182
We postpone the exploration of the mechanics of section 1124
until we explore the question: Can a plan proponent who has per-
suaded a majority of each class, except one, force that class to take
some treatment which it does not vote to accept and still operate
under section 1129(a)(8) rather than under the cramdown of sec-
tion 1129(b)?' 83
An acceptance of a plan is much harder to obtain than a rejec-
.tion. The chapter 11 statutory majority of each class needed for a
section 1129(a) confirmation may be harder to obtain than the less
demanding majority under chapter XI. Confirmation under sec-
tion 1129(a)(8) is impossible if holders of one-third plus one dollar
in amount of a single class reject the plan. Confirmation is also
impossible if a majority in number of claim holders reject. (It
might be easier to obtain a majority under chapter 11 than under
old chapter XI in that the nonvoters do not count as rejectors.)
When the statutory minority of a single class rejects the plan, and
thus makes satisfaction of section 1129(a)(8) impossible, the plan
must be abandoned, or resort to another provision of chapter 11 is
required. On one interpretation of sections 1124 and 1126(f), the
plan proponent may be fortunate enough to get help by in effect
disenfranchising the objecting class under those two sections. ' 84 If
he cannot achieve his purpose through section 1124, and he can-
181. 15 Bankr. 952 (D. Utah 1981).
182. Id. at 967-70.
183. See infra notes 185-204 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
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not change the score by negotiating with those who have dis-
sented, the plan proponent would then be faced with
abandonment of the plan or with the perils of a section 1129(b)
cramdown of the rejecting class.
VI. SECTION 1129(b)-THE CRAMDOWN
If confirmation of a plan under section 1129(a)(8) can be lik-
ened (with variations) to confirmation of an arrangement under
the simple provisions of old chapter XI, confirmation of a plan
under section 1129(b) can be compared (again with variations) to
confirmation under chapter X in what might be one of its most
complicated forms. Where the parties cannot agree on changes in
rights of the respective parties, the role of the judge becomes more
important, and the law must be more specific as to what the judge
can and cannot do. Section 1129(b), with its detailed require-
ments, now controls. That section, in effect, substitutes the judge's
determination for that of the statutory majority of the rejecting
class on the question: Is the plan fair and equitable to and does it
not discriminate against that class? To what extent can a judge
under subection (b) of section 1129 require a rejecting class to ac-
cept a plan which has been accepted by a majority of each other
impaired class?
Subsections (a) and (b) of section 1129 differ from each other
as the day differs from the night. If the plan proponent can obtain
consent of a statutory majority of each class, with relatively minor
restrictions, what the classes accept under section 1129(a)(8) will
be the plan. If this majority of each class allows participation by a
class with no equity, so be it. If a majority of a class accepts moon
rocks for a debt claim, if each other class accepts, the debtor can
have his plan confirmed, unless some member of the class can
prove that the value of the moon rocks is less than he would have
recieved in a liquidation.
Even if the plan proponent must force a rejecting class to ac-
cept something it does not like, the bargain between the debtor
and the accepting classes represented by the plan will not be dis-
turbed by the judge. It is conceivable that if a lower priority class
were to convince the judge that a higher priority class was given
too much, the debtor and that class might have to agree that the
higher class would get less.
With respect to the rejecting class, however, the role of the
judge changes. The judge now must act more like the judge in an
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old chapter X case and make independent determinations within
the closely circumscribed area of section 1129(b). The fair and
equitable rule returns, but applies only to the rejecting class, and it
is modified but not necessarily relaxed as to the protection given
under section 1129(b) to the rejecting class. If the treatment of the
rejecting class exhausts the estate, indirectly it will affect lower
priority classes. The rejecting class can be crammed down only
under rules in some ways more strict, in some ways less strict, than
those under section 77 or chapter X.
Section 1129(b) consists of two separate parts, each with its
own history and tests.
The first part, section 1129(b)(1), states:
[Ihf all of the applicable requirements of subsection (a) of this
section other than paragraph (8) are met with respect to a plan,
the court, on request of the proponent of the plan, shall confirm
the plan notwithstanding the requirements of such paragraph if
the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equita-
ble, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is im-
paired under, and has not accepted, the plan.
The judge is required to make findings on the two require-
ments of this section. First, the judge must determine that the
plan does not discriminate against the class which has rejected the
plan. The legislative history indicates that this provision means
principally that no prior class is more than fully compensated.
The second, and more difficult determination the judge must
make under this section is that the plan is fair and equitable to the
rejecting class. Again, we must resort to history to know what
Congress had in mind. Briefly, this second test, going back to Case
v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co. 85 and equity receivership
cases which long preceded it, requires that each member of a se-
nior class receives full compensation before any junior class re-
ceives or retains an interest in the reorganized corporation,
whether in securities of the new entity with earnings prospects or
with voting power only, or with other property except for
equivalent new value.
186
Case did not involve the mechanics of determining values of
new securities to be distributed. An early case which spelled out
the mechanics of determining what was fair and equitable was
185. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
186. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913) and cases cited therein. For
an early case, see Railroad Co. v. Howard, 74 U.S. 392 (1868).
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Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois.'87 That case (and the
cases which followed it) generally is considered to have required
that reorganization values of the reorganized entity be determined
primarily by estimating future earnings of the reorganized corpo-
ration and capitalizing those estimated earnings by an appropriate
multiple to produce a capitalized entity value. That figure, in
turn, would set a ceiling on the amount of debt and stock which
could be issued. When the 1940 railroad reorganization cases
went up to the Supreme Court, the Court approved in Ecker v.
Great Western R.R. Corp., 88 an alternative method used by the
Interstate Commerce Commission in railroad reorganizations.
This method omitted capitalizing the estimated earnings and di-
rectly compared the available estimated earnings against the inter-
est or dividend requirements of the securities to be issued in
substitution for the old, taking the classes in the order of their
priority. Under either test, when the stream of estimated earnings
was exhausted, holders of the securities for which there were no
estimated earnings available were given nothing-they were
eliminated.
Under either test, the holders of the old senior securities had to
be compensated in full. Under each test, estimated earnings were
crucial in determining values. Under neither test, was there any
pretense that the then market value of the new securities would
equal the amount of the old claim replaced. It seems, therefore,
that there was a hypothetical aspect to determining the "reorgani-
zation value" of the compensation-the value to come after ap-
propriate seasoning of the new securities and based on predictions
as to what the future would bring.
The determination of both the estimate of earnings and the
earnings multiple allowed for considerable judgment. As Justice
Douglas recognized in Consolidated Rock Products, the process
produced at best "an educated guess."' 9 The parties can only
hope that it is not an uneducated guess. It may be that the chapter
11 judge will be even less equipped to pass on the reasonableness
of that guess than was the judge under old section 77, or 77B, or
chapter X. Under those statutes, the judge who passed on the rea-
sonableness of the process would have been living with the case
from its inception.
187. 312 U.S. 510 (1941). See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
188. 318 U.S. 448 (1943).
189. 312 U.S. at 526. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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A. Incorporation into the Fair and Equitable Rule of Cramdown
Requirements-Old and New
Under chapter 11, the judge may have little contact with the
case in any form unless a party in interest raises a question that
calls for a judicial decision; he is likely to have no background as
to earnings or values until the parties recognize, by invoking sec-
tion 1129(b), that they cannot settle these matters among
themselves.
A reader who is unfamiliar with the predecessors of section
1129 may find it necessary to go back to history to understand
what Congress had in mind in chapter 11. Subsection (1) of sec-
tion 1129(b) is a modified carryover from the fair and equitable
test as we knew it under old section 77B of the act and under the
chapters which replaced and supplemented that section in 1938.
The old rule is modified by section 1129(b)(1) principally in that,
like its partner 1129(b)(2), it applies only to the rejecting class.
Subsection (2) of 1129(b) is different. Its statutory precursors
most likely would not have been considered as a part of the fair
and equitable rule which applied to reorganizations generally, but
a separate doctrine which applied only to the rare case where a
plan was crammed down on a nonassenting class. Since the fair
and equitable rule applies under chapter 11 only to a cramdown,
it is not too surprising that both subsections (1) and (2) are treated
as part of the fair and equitable rule of section 1129(b). 190
Section 1129(b)(2) was derived from different statutory prece-
dents. While immediately prior to the enactment of chapter 11 a
fair and equitable rule somewhat comparable to that of section
1129(b)(1) (it could be invoked by any member of any class) ap-
plied to all reorganization confirmations under section 77 or chap-
ter X, each of those statutes and chapter XII had a separate
provision, not considered part of the fair and equitable principle,
which applied only to a class of creditors who were affected by
and did not accept the plan by the majority required under the
applicable statute. Section 216(7) of chapter X allowed confirma-
tion despite rejection by a class of secured claims if the plan gave
190. Compare In re Bel Air Assoc., 4 BANKR. 168 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (sketchy analysis
of earnings estimate) with the better reasoned cases In re Nite Lite Inns, 17 BANKR. 367
(S.D. Cal. 1982), and In re Landau Boat Co., 8 BANKR. 436 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (confirmation
of plan first refused; plan later confirmed with modifications in 13 BANKR. 788 (W.D. Mo.
1981)). See also In re Landmark at Park Plaza, Ltd., 7 BANKR. 653 (D.N.J. 1980) (confir-
mation of plan denied after an analysis of economic factors bearing on the plan's
feasibility).
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adequate protection for the realization by the holders of the
value of their claims against the property dealt with by the plan
and affected by such claims, either as provided in the plan or in
the order confirming the plan (a) by the transfer or sale, or by
the retention by the debtor, of such property subject to such
claims [cf. section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)]; or (b) by a sale of such
property free of such claims, at not less than a fair upset price,
and the transfer of such claims to the proceeds of such sale [cf.
section 1129(b)(2)(ii)]; or (c) by appraisal and payment in cash
of the value of such claims [cf. section 1124(3)]; or (d) by such
method as will, under and consistent with the circumstances of
the particular case, equitably and fairlI99 Frovide such protection
[f section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii)] ....
It would seem that the chapter X draftsmen had secured, rather
than unsecured, claims in mind. References to the "property sub-
ject to such claims" do not automatically fit unsecured claims.
Section 77(e) is more general: "Provided, that if the plan has
not been so accepted, the judge may nevertheless confirm the plan
if he is satisfied that it makes adequate provision for fair and equi-
table treatment for those rejecting it; that such rejection was not
reasonably justified. .. .
Section 1129(b)(2), by comparison, reflects quite different
treatment. This section deals separately with secured claims in
(A), with unsecured in (B), and with interests in (C). t92 The Act
191. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 1(216)(7), 52 Stat. 840, 896.
192. 11 U.S.C. § I129(b)(2) (Supp. III 1979). This section provides:
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and
equitable with respect to a class includes the following requirements (emphasis
added):
(A) With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides
(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the lien securing such claims,
whether the property subject to such lien is retained by the debtor or trans-
ferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such
claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of
such claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of
such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the
value of such holder's interest in the estate's interest in such property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property
that is subject to the lien securing such claims, free and clear of such lien,
with such lien to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and the treatment of
such lien on proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent of
such claims.
(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims
(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class receive or
retain on account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date
of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of
such class will not receive or retain on account of such junior claim or
interest any property.
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had no separate treatment now covered by (B) and (C).
It should be kept in mind that the above provisions of chapter
X and section 77, unlike the fair and equitable rule in general, and
like sections 1129(b)(1) and (2), applied only to the dissenting
class. Under chapter X and section 77, the fair and equitable test,
akin to that of section 1129(b)(1), applied to every member of
every class. Under section 129(b), neither tesi need be applied ex-
cept to the dissenting class or classes.
B. A Comparison of Denver & Rio Grande as Decided and as
It Would Be Decided Under Section 1129(b) (2)
In considering the position under section 1129(b)(2) of the se-
cured creditor who rejects the plan, it is pertinent to compare the
treatment given to the dissenting class in Reconstruction Finance
Corp. v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. ,193 with the
treatment that now would be given under section 1129(b)(2)(A)
and perhaps also (B). For simplicity, we assume that Rio
Grande's status as a railroad does not affect the operation of
1129(b). The Code is new in separating the secured and un-
secured portions of what hopefully was secured debt. Perhaps
contrary to fact, we will first assume that this class of bondholders,
which was given the lowest priority by the ICC and who rejected
the plan, were secured fully on an asset basis. The ICC found that
there was no room in the capital structure, as dictated by esti-
mated earnings of the railroad, for any participation by the old
common or the old unsecured debt.194 In fact, estimated earnings
would allow the junior secured bondholders to receive only ten
percent of the amount of their debt, and that ten percent would be
in the form of common stock.195 This junior secured class, as
noted above, rejected the plan. 196
(C) With respect to a class of interests
(i) the plan provides that each holder of an interest of such class receive
or retain on account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective
date of the plan, equal to the greatest of the allowed amount of any fixed
liquidation preference to which such holder is entitled, any fixed redemp-
tion price to which such holder is entitled, and the value of such interest; or
(ii) the holder of any interest that is junior to the interests of such class
will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior interest
any property.
The italicized words in subsection (2) make it clear that compliance with sub-
section (2) is not an alternative to compliance with subsection (1).
193. 328 U.S. 495 (1946).
194. Id. at 501-02.
195. d. at 502.
196. Id. at 501.
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One test was whether the holders had been unreasonable in
rejecting the plan. The Supreme Court held that since the class
had received everything remaining after the satisfaction of prior
claims, the class had been unreasonable in rejecting. 97 The dis-
trict court's order of confirmation was upheld. Had chapter 11
applied, that treatment of a secured class, to the extent it was se-
cured, would not fit any subsection of section 1129(b)(2)(A).
We have supposed that the bonds were truly secured on an
asset basis. Suppose that the assets serving the debt were assets of
a line to be discontinued and thus had no earning power. Could
there then be a cramdown under section 1 129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) or
(II)? These sections provide that old secured debt can be replaced
only with new secured debt. Certainly no issuance of a new se-
cured debt-or unsecured debt-equal to the amount of the old
debt would be consistent with the future earnings valuation and
the feasibility requirements of section 77 and, if it had applied,
section 1129(a)(11). Perhaps the discontinued line could be sold
for something under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). The proceeds could
not be invested pursuant to clause (1) for the reason given
above--only bonds were permitted by that section, and feasibility
tests prohibited more bonds. Perhaps some property other than a
security could be given under subsection (A)(iii). Perhaps there
was some kind of property other than unsecured debt or common
stock of the debtor which might have satisfied the indubitable
equivalent under subsection (iii). The legislative history indicates
that neither unsecured debt nor the issuer's stock is the indubita-
ble equivalent of secured debt.'9 8
The greater possibility is that if section 506 had applied, the
bonds in Denver Rio Grande would have been found to be par-
tially secured or not secured at all. A senior class may have used
up the collateral on which the bonds had a junior lien. Determi-
nations under section 506 were not res judicata. The bondholders,
as holders of unsecured claims, could be treated under section
1129(b)(2)(B)--either given some property equal in value to the
amount of the debt under subsection (B)(i) or all junior interests
eliminated under subsection (B)(ii). There would still be no room
in the capital structure for the lower amount of new secured debt
required by section 1129(b)(2)(A) to the extent the debt was se-
cured. The 1940 railroad reorganization cases demonstrated that
197. Id. at 535.
198. 124 CONG. REc. S 17,421 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
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the fair and equitable rule meant the elimination of all classes be-
low the undercompensated prior class. 99 The secured creditor,
even if only partly secured, cannot, to the extent secured under
subsections 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) and (ii), be required to accept prop-
erty other than new secured debt, and no more secured debt can
be issued. To the extent the old debt was unsecured, the treatment
under section 77 of chapter X and 1129(b)(2)(B) would appear to
be about the same-if the old debt is not compensated in full jun-
ior interests are eliminated, and the old debt can be satisfied with
whatever is left.
If the old debt had been secured, the plan proponent had
much greater freedom under section 77 regarding the form of the
compensation if the plan gave the rejecting class the required
value. In the case of a nonrailroad debtor, we could contrast the
comparative freedom of old section 216(7)200 with the straight-
jacket of new section 1129(b)(2)(A); there is some similarity be-
tween what we may fairly call the "catch-all" of the two sections.
With respect to a class of secured claims, section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii)
states that a plan provides for "the realization by such holders of
the indubitable equivalent of such claims."2 0° Under section
216(7)(d), a reorganization plan must provide "for the realization
• ..of the value of their claims against the property dealt with by
the plan and affected by such claims, either as provided in the
plan or. . .by such method as will, under and consistent with the
circumstances of the particular case, equitably and fairly provide
[adequate] protection. '2 °2
Although the "indubitable equivalent" language of section
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) seems similar to the language of section 216(7),
recall that section 1129's legislative history indicates that stock or
unsecured debt of the debtor cannot satisfy that "indubitable
equivalent."2 3 Property other than the debtor's own stock or un-
secured debt might be sufficient."° If the debtor has some asset
not essential to its continued operations, could some distribution
of the excess property to the rejecting class satisfy the "indubitable
equivalent" test of section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii)?
199. See, e.g., Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac.
R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943); Ecker v. Western Pac. R.R, 318 U.S. 448 (1943).
200. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 1(216)(7), 52 Stat. 840, 896.
201. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. III 1979).
202. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 1(216)(7)(d), 52 Stat. 840, 896.
203. See 124 CONG. Rac. H 11,104 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978).
204. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5787.
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It is not at all impossible for a court to have determined that
the claim is fully or partially secured under section 506(a) and
later determine that there is no room in a future capital structure
for the new bonds to replace the old to the extent secured. A sec-
tion 506(a) determination may have been made at an earlier stage
in the case and may have been properly based on asset value. The
capitalized earnings value which sets a ceiling on the new capital
structure has little or no relation to asset values. It is possible that
an imaginative plan proponent can satisfy the requirements of sec-
tion 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) by giving the rejecting secured class assets
which have little or no earning power in the reorganized enter-
prise but which have value for some other purpose. It is almost
inevitable that there will be cases where the capital structure must
be reduced, that there is value for a junior secured party, but the
property to be given cannot be fitted into section 1129(b)(2)(A)
and 1129(a)(11).
Did Congress intend to give a class of secured creditors abso-
lute veto power when the class rejects a plan but cannot be cov-
ered by the provisions of section 1129(b)(2)(A)? The policy
determination is not simple, even if we assume that what is good
for the secured creditor is good for the country. Secured creditors
A, B, & C, for example, who are prior in right to D, the rejecting
class, all believe that continuation of the enterprise is in the best
interest of the class. Assume that section 1129(b)(1) presents no
problem. Unfortunately, secured creditor D, in his opinion less
generously treated under the plan, does not share the opinions of
A, B, and C. The fair and equitable rule embodied in (b)(2), and
supplemented by the feasibility requirement of section 1129(a)(l 1)
has made it impossible for the plan to give anything to unsecured
creditors and equity holders. If the lowest class of secured credi-
tors is in fact secured, can that class be given anything? Are se-
cured creditors A, B, & C absolutely stopped by secured party D
who now can be forced to accept only cash under section 1124(3),
or secured cash payments in the future under section
1129(b)(2)(A), or some property other than unsecured debt or
common stock of the debtor? There is no cash for a section 1124
payment, and the estimated earnings ceiling on capitalization and
the requirements of section 1 129(a)(1 1) prevent issuance of the se-
cured debt needed to satisfy section 1129(b)(2)(A).
There may be a practical answer to what is at least a theoreti-
cal problem-there will always be some normally secured debt
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which in fact is unsecured and can be treated under section
1129(b)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).
This brief discussion of section 1129(b) is by no means com-
plete. We have not raised the question as to whether a full-fledg-
ed earnings valuation will be necessary in every case to determine
whether the value of the deferred debt under section
1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) is at least equal to the value of the collateral.
The requirements of section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) that "holders. . .re-
tain the lien. ."I" have not been mentioned. Under the fair and
equitable rule embodied in section 1129(b)(1), it was well estab-
lished that the substitute debt is not required to be secured and
certainly not by the same collateral. In the railroad cases, it often
was often necessary to consolidate divisional mortgages into a sys-
tem mortgage which did not present any problems under the fair
and equitable rule as long as any stepdown in quality was taken
into account.2 °6 This consolidation would not be permitted under
section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I). The value of the deferred payment
under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) has not been explored.
We have not explored the problems of issuing securities in the
amount of the old debt but with a value equal to that of the collat-
eral. Will such an issuance square with the feasibility require-
ments of section 1129(a)(11)? We have examined only briefly the
possibility that under section 1129(b)(2)(A) the collateral may be
sold and the lien transferred to the proceeds when the debt of the
rejecting class is secured by collateral which the entity does not
need to effect a reorganization. Some or all of the collateral, how-
ever, is often so essential to continued operations that it must be
retained.
More importantly, this Article has not discussed the possibility
that a cramdown, at the request of a plan proponent who repre-
sents the equity interests, may effectively eliminate that interest if
the entity cannot compensate in full the unsecured rejecting class
with any kind of property. If section 1129(a)(2)(B)(i) cannot be
satisfied, subsection (ii) permits confirmation only when the plan
eliminates the classes below the secured debt. The fair and equi-
table rule of section 1129(b)(1) and the feasibility requirement of
section 1129(a)(11) may prohibit issuance of stock to the rejecting
class.
Subsection (C)(ii)(c) of section 1129(b)(2) deals with elimina-
205. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. III 1979).
206. See supra note 198.
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tion of classes junior to the rejecting class, including stock or other
equity interests. A junior class plan proponent is not likely inten-
tionally to cramdown his own class. To eliminate these interests,
it would seem that a member of a senior class would have to pro-
pose a plan which calls for the elimination of a junior class under
section 1129(b)(2)(C). This plan often would involve a full-blown
earnings valuation to determine whether the class has no equity.
The conclusion that it is wise to conduct negotiations aimed at
producing a plan which will receive consent from the statutory
majority of each class seems obvious. Perhaps the principal use of
section 1129(b) will be as a bargaining club which dissidents on
the one hand or plan proponents on the other may employ to
reach agreement rather than face the trials and tribulations of a
section 1129(b) proceeding.
VII. A CONCLUSION AND A QUESTION
Apart from old chapter XII cramdowns of the Pinegate type,
cramdowns have been rare. It is hoped they will continue to be
rare in the future. The need to know what can be done to a non-
accepting class under chapter 11, however, cannot be measured by
the infrequency of cramdown occurrences. In determining how
far a class may agree to go, it is important to know how far the
class can be pushed.
This Article disregards the common notion held by Congress
and others that the method by which the Bankruptcy Code was
enacted made it inevitable that some dropped stitches would have
to be picked up. Congress and students of the bankruptcy process
are working on that task. When this task is complete, minor im-
perfections should be cured. It would seem that the process of
confirming a reorganization through consent of a majority of each
class as contemplated by section 1129(a) should be workable. Old
chapter XI demonstrated that much can be done by consent of
individual secured creditors without the aid of majority pressure
on the minority of a class, and without that pressure on secured
creditors or equity interests. The problems are more complicated
when a reorganization plan is rejected by one or more classes.
There will be occasions, therefore, when plans must be resolved
through the judicial process rather than through agreement of the
majority of each class. The need for protection of the rejecting
class is obvious. If we accept the basic thesis of corporate reorgan-
ization law that liquidation is often an unacceptable method of
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handling an entity which seems to be economically viable, is there
not a corresponding need to allow a reorganization where a class
rejects a plan, with additional restraints, but comparable to the
more flexible restraints imposed by section 77(e) in reorganization
of a railroad or that of section 216(7) of chapter X for a
nonrailroad entity?
